Cinta bisa jadi merupakan kata yang paling banyak dibicarakan manusia. Setiap orang memiliki rasa cinta yang bisa diaplikasikan pada banyak hal. Wanita, harta, anak, kendaraan, rumah dan berbagai kenikmatan dunia lainnya merupakan sasaran utama cinta dari kebanyakan manusia. Cinta yang paling tinggi dan mulia adalah cinta seorang hamba kepada Rabb-nya.
Kita sering mendengar kata yang terdiri dari lima huruf: CINTA. Setiap orang bahkan telah merasakannya, namun sulit untuk mendefinisikannya. Terlebih untuk mengetahui hakikatnya. Berdasarkan hal itu, seseorang dengan gampang bisa keluar dari jeratan hukum syariat ketika bendera cinta diangkat. Seorang pezina dengan gampang tanpa diiringi rasa malu mengatakan, “Kami sama-sama cinta, suka sama suka.” Karena alasan cinta, seorang bapak membiarkan anak-anaknya bergelimang dalam dosa. Dengan alasan cinta pula, seorang suami melepas istrinya hidup bebas tanpa ada ikatan dan tanpa rasa cemburu sedikitpun.
Demikianlah bila kebodohan telah melanda kehidupan dan kebenaran tidak lagi menjadi tolok ukur. Dalam keadaan seperti ini, setan tampil mengibarkan benderanya dan menabuh genderang penyesatan dengan mengangkat cinta sebagai landasan bagi pembolehan terhadap segala yang dilarang Allah dan Rasul-Nya Muhammad . Allah berfirman:
“Dijadikan indah pada (pandangan) manusia kecintaan kepada apa-apa yang diingini yaitu: wanita-wanita, anak-anak, harta yang banyak dari jenis emas, perak, kuda pilihan, binatang-binatang ternak dan sawah ladang. Itulah kesenangan hidup di dunia dan di sisi Allah-lah tempat kembali yang baik.” (Ali ‘Imran: 14)
Rasulullah dalam haditsnya dari shahabat Tsauban mengatakan: ‘Hampir-hampir orang-orang kafir mengerumuni kalian sebagaimana berkerumunnya di atas sebuah tempayan.’ Seseorang berkata: ‘Wahai Rasulullah, apakah jumlah kita saat itu sangat sedikit?’ Rasulullah berkata: ‘Bahkan kalian saat itu banyak akan tetapi kalian bagaikan buih di atas air. Dan Allah benar-benar akan mencabut rasa ketakutan dari hati musuh kalian dan benar-benar Allah akan campakkan ke dalam hati kalian (penyakit) al-wahn.’ Seseorang bertanya: ‘Apakah yang dimaksud dengan al-wahn wahai Rasulullah?’ Rasulullah menjawab: ‘Cinta dunia dan takut mati.’ (HR. Abu Dawud no. 4297, dan dishahihkan oleh Asy-Syaikh Al-Albani dalam Shahih Sunan Abi Dawud no. 3610)
Asy-Syaikh ‘Abdurrahman As-Sa’di dalam tafsirnya mengatakan: “Allah memberitakan dalam dua ayat ini (Ali ‘Imran: 13-14) tentang keadaan manusia kaitannya dengan masalah lebih mencintai kehidupan dunia daripada akhirat, dan Allah menjelaskan perbedaan yang besar antara dua negeri tersebut. Allah memberitakan bahwa hal-hal tersebut (syahwat, wanita, anak-anak, dsb) dihiaskan kepada manusia sehingga membelalakkan pandangan mereka dan menancapkannya di dalam hati-hati mereka, semuanya berakhir kepada segala bentuk kelezatan jiwa. Sebagian besar condong kepada perhiasan dunia tersebut dan menjadikannya sebagai tujuan terbesar dari cita-cita, cinta dan ilmu mereka. Padahal semua itu adalah perhiasan yang sedikit dan akan hilang dalam waktu yang sangat cepat.”
Definisi Cinta
Untuk mendefinisikan cinta sangatlah sulit, karena tidak bisa dijangkau dengan kalimat dan sulit diraba dengan kata-kata. Ibnul Qayyim mengatakan: “Cinta tidak bisa didefinisikan dengan jelas, bahkan bila didefinisikan tidak menghasilkan (sesuatu) melainkan menambah kabur dan tidak jelas, (berarti) definisinya adalah adanya cinta itu sendiri.” (Madarijus Salikin, 3/9)
Hakikat Cinta
Cinta adalah sebuah amalan hati yang akan terwujud dalam (amalan) lahiriah. Apabila cinta tersebut sesuai dengan apa yang diridhai Allah, maka ia akan menjadi ibadah. Dan sebaliknya, jika tidak sesuai dengan ridha-Nya maka akan menjadi perbuatan maksiat. Berarti jelas bahwa cinta adalah ibadah hati yang bila keliru menempatkannya akan menjatuhkan kita ke dalam sesuatu yang dimurkai Allah yaitu kesyirikan.
Cinta kepada Allah
Cinta yang dibangun karena Allah akan menghasilkan kebaikan yang sangat banyak dan berharga. Ibnul Qayyim dalam Madarijus Salikin (3/22) berkata: ”Sebagian salaf mengatakan bahwa suatu kaum telah mengaku cinta kepada Allah lalu Allah menurunkan ayat ujian kepada mereka:
“Katakanlah: jika kalian cinta kepada Allah maka ikutilah aku, niscaya Allah akan mencintai kalian.” (Ali ‘Imran: 31)
Mereka (sebagian salaf) berkata: “(firman Allah) ‘Niscaya Allah akan mencintai kalian’, ini adalah isyarat tentang bukti kecintaan tersebut dan buah serta faidahnya. Bukti dan tanda (cinta kepada Allah) adalah mengikuti Rasulullah , faidah dan buahnya adalah kecintaan Allah kepada kalian. Jika kalian tidak mengikuti Rasulullah maka kecintaan Allah kepada kalian tidak akan terwujud dan akan hilang.”
Bila demikian keadaannya, maka mendasarkan cinta kepada orang lain karena-Nya tentu akan mendapatkan kemuliaan dan nilai di sisi Allah. Rasulullah bersabda dalam hadits yang diriwayatkan dari Anas bin Malik :
“Tiga hal yang barangsiapa ketiganya ada pada dirinya, niscaya dia akan mendapatkan manisnya iman. Hendaklah Allah dan Rasul-Nya lebih ia cintai daripada selain keduanya, dan hendaklah dia mencintai seseorang dan tidaklah dia mencintainya melainkan karena Allah, dan hendaklah dia benci untuk kembali kepada kekufuran setelah Allah selamatkan dia dari kekufuran itu sebagaimana dia benci untuk dilemparkan ke dalam neraka.” (HR. Al-Bukhari no. 16 dan Muslim no. 43)
Ibnul Qayyim mengatakan bahwa di antara sebab-sebab adanya cinta (kepada Allah) ada sepuluh perkara:
Pertama, membaca Al Qur’an, menggali, dan memahami makna-maknanya serta apa yang dimaukannya.
Kedua, mendekatkan diri kepada Allah dengan amalan-amalan sunnah setelah amalan wajib.
Ketiga, terus-menerus berdzikir dalam setiap keadaan.
Keempat, mengutamakan kecintaan Allah di atas kecintaanmu ketika bergejolaknya nafsu.
Kelima, hati yang selalu menggali nama-nama dan sifat-sifat Allah, menyaksikan dan mengetahuinya.
Keenam, menyaksikan kebaikan-kebaikan Allah dan segala nikmat-Nya.
Ketujuh, tunduknya hati di hadapan Allah .
Kedelapan, berkhalwat (menyendiri dalam bermunajat) bersama-Nya ketika Allah turun (ke langit dunia).
Kesembilan, duduk bersama orang-orang yang memiliki sifat cinta dan jujur.
Kesepuluh, menjauhkan segala sebab-sebab yang akan menghalangi hati dari Allah . (Madarijus Salikin, 3/18, dengan ringkas)
Cinta adalah Ibadah
Sebagaimana telah lewat, cinta merupakan salah satu dari ibadah hati yang memiliki kedudukan tinggi dalam agama sebagaimana ibadah-ibadah yang lain. Allah berfirman:
“Tetapi Allah menjadikan kamu cinta kepada keimanan dan menjadikan iman itu indah dalam hatimu.” (Al-Hujurat: 7)
“Dan orang-orang yang beriman lebih cinta kepada Allah.” (Al-Baqarah: 165)
“Maka Allah akan mendatangkan suatu kaum yang Allah mencintai mereka dan merekapun mencintai-Nya.” (Al-Maidah: 54)
Adapun dalil dari hadits Rasulullah adalah hadits Anas yang telah disebut di atas yang dikeluarkan oleh Al-Imam Al-Bukhari dan Al-Imam Muslim: “Hendaklah Allah dan Rasul-Nya lebih dia cintai daripada selain keduanya.”
Macam-macam cinta
Di antara para ulama ada yang membagi cinta menjadi dua bagian dan ada yang membaginya menjadi empat. Asy-Syaikh Muhammad bin ‘Abdulwahhab Al-Yamani dalam kitab Al-Qaulul Mufid fi Adillatit Tauhid (hal. 114) menyatakan bahwa cinta ada empat macam:
Pertama, cinta ibadah.
Yaitu mencintai Allah dan apa-apa yang dicintai-Nya, dengan dalil ayat dan hadits di atas.
Kedua, cinta syirik.
Yaitu mencintai Allah dan juga selain-Nya. Allah berfirman:
“Dan di antara manusia ada yang menjadikan selain Allah sebagai tandingan-tandingan (bagi Allah), mereka mencintai tandingan-tandingan tersebut seperti cinta mereka kepada Allah.” (Al-Baqarah: 165)
Ketiga, cinta maksiat.
Yaitu cinta yang akan menyebabkan seseorang melaksanakan apa yang diharamkan Allah dan meninggalkan apa-apa yang diperintahkan-Nya. Allah berfirman:
“Dan kalian mencintai harta benda dengan kecintaan yang sangat.” (Al-Fajr: 20)
Keempat, cinta tabiat.
Seperti cinta kepada anak, keluarga, diri, harta dan perkara lain yang dibolehkan. Namun tetap cinta ini sebatas cinta tabiat. Allah berfirman:
“Ketika mereka (saudara-saudara Yusuf ‘alaihis salam) berkata: ‘Yusuf dan adiknya lebih dicintai oleh bapak kita daripada kita.” (Yusuf: 8)
Jika cinta tabiat ini menyebabkan kita tersibukkan dan lalai dari ketaatan kepada Allah sehingga meninggalkan kewajiban-kewajiban, maka berubahlah menjadi cinta maksiat. Bila cinta tabiat ini menyebabkan kita lebih cinta kepada benda-benda tersebut sehingga sama seperti cinta kita kepada Allah atau bahkan lebih, maka cinta tabiat ini berubah menjadi cinta syirik.
Buah cinta
Syaikhul Islam Ibnu Taimiyyah mengatakan: “Ketahuilah bahwa yang menggerakkan hati menuju Allah ada tiga perkara: cinta, takut, dan harapan. Dan yang paling kuat adalah cinta, dan cinta itu sendiri merupakan tujuan karena akan didapatkan di dunia dan di akhirat.” (Majmu’ Fatawa, 1/95)
Asy-Syaikh ‘Abdurrahman As-Sa’di menyatakan: “Dasar tauhid dan ruhnya adalah keikhlasan dalam mewujudkan cinta kepada Allah. Cinta merupakan landasan penyembahan dan peribadatan kepada-Nya, bahkan cinta itu merupakan hakikat ibadah. Tidak akan sempurna tauhid kecuali bila kecintaan seorang hamba kepada Rabbnya juga sempurna.” (Al-Qaulus Sadid, hal. 110)
Bila kita ditanya bagaimana hukumnya cinta kepada selain Allah? Maka kita tidak boleh mengatakan haram dengan spontan atau mengatakan boleh secara global, akan tetapi jawabannya perlu dirinci.
Pertama, bila dia mencintai selain Allah lebih besar atau sama dengan cintanya kepada Allah maka ini adalah cinta syirik, hukumnya jelas haram.
Kedua, bila dengan cinta kepada selain Allah menyebabkan kita terjatuh dalam maksiat maka cinta ini adalah cinta maksiat, hukumnya haram.
Ketiga, bila merupakan cinta tabiat maka yang seperti ini diperbolehkan.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Filosofi Cinta
Saturday, May 9, 2009
The Nature of Love: Physical, emotional, spiritual
Some may hold that love is physical, i.e., that love is nothing but a physical response to another whom the agent feels physically attracted
to. Accordingly, the action of loving encompasses a broad range of behaviour including caring, listening, attending to, preferring to others, and so on. (This would be proposed by behaviourists). Others (physicalists, geneticists) reduce all examinations of love to the physical motivation of the sexual impulse-the simple sexual instinct that is shared with all complex living entities, which may, in humans, be directed consciously, sub-consciously or pre-rationally toward a potential mate or object of sexual gratification.
Physical determinists, those who believe the world to entirely physical and that every event has a prior (physical cause), consider love to be an extension of the chemical-biological constituents of the human creature and be explicable according to such processes. In this vein, geneticists may invoke the theory that the genes (an individual's DNA) form the determining criteria in any sexual or putative romantic choice, especially in choosing a mate. However, a problem for those who claim that love is reducible to the physical attractiveness of a potential mate, or to the blood ties of family and kin which forge bonds of filial love, is that it does not capture the affections between those who cannot or wish not to reproduce-that is,
physicalism or determinism ignores the possibility of romantic, ideational love-it may explain eros, but not philia or agape.
Behaviourism, which stems from the theory of the mind and asserts a rejection of Cartesian dualism between mind and body, entails that love is a series of actions and preferences which is thereby observable to oneself and others. The behaviourist theory that love is observable (according to the recognisable behavioural constraints corresponding to acts of love) suggests also that it is theoretically quantifiable: that A acts in a certain way (actions X,Y,Z) around B, more so than he does around C, suggests that he 'loves' B more than C. The problem with the behaviourist vision of love is that it is susceptible to the poignant criticism that a person's actions need not express their inner state or emotions-A may be a very good actor. Radical behaviourists, such as B F Skinner, claim that observable and unobservable behaviour such as mental states can be examined from the behaviourist framework, in terms of the laws of conditioning. On this view, that one falls in love may go unrecognised by the casual observer, but the act of being in love can be examined by what events or conditions led to the agent's believing she was in love: this may include the theory that being in love is an overtly strong reaction to a set of highly positive conditions in the behaviour or presence of another.
Expressionist love is similar to behaviourism in that love is considered an expression of a state of affairs towards a beloved, which may be communicated through language (words, poetry, music) or behaviour (bringing flowers, giving up a kidney, diving into the proverbial burning building), but which is a reflection of an internal, emotional state, rather than an exhibition of physical responses to stimuli. Others in this vein may claim love to be a spiritual response, the recognition of a soul that completes one's own soul, or complements or augments it. The spiritualist vision of love incorporates mystical as well as traditional romantic notions of love, but rejects the behaviorist or physicalist explanations.
Those who consider love to be an aesthetic response would hold that love is knowable through the emotional and conscious feeling it provokes yet which cannot perhaps be captured in rational or descriptive language: it is instead to be captured, as far as that is possible, by metaphor or by music.
Friday, April 3, 2009
Love: Ethics and Politics
The ethical aspects in love involve the moral appropriateness of loving, and the forms it should or should not take. The subject area raises such questions as: is it ethically acceptable to love an object, or to love oneself? Is love to oneself or to another a duty? Should the ethically minded person aim to love all people equally? Is partial love morally acceptable or permissible (i.e., not right, but excusable)? Should love only involve those with whom the agent can have a meaningful relationship? Should love aim to transcend sexual desire or physical appearances? May notions of romantic, sexual love apply to same sex couples? Some of the subject area naturally spills into the ethics of sex, which deals with the appropriateness of sexual activity, reproduction, hetero and homosexual activity, and so on.
In the area of political philosophy, love can be studied from a variety of perspectives. For example, some may see love as an instantiation of social dominance by one group (males) over another (females), in which the socially constructed language and etiquette of love is designed to empower men and disempower women. On this theory, love is a product of patriarchy, and acts analogously to Marx's view of religion (the opiate of the people) that love is the opiate of women. The implication is that were they to shrug off the language and notions of 'love', 'being in love', 'loving someone', and so on, they would be empowered. The theory is often attractive to feminists and marxists, who view social relations (and the entire panoply of culture, language, politics, institutions) as reflecting deeper social structures that divide people into classes, sexes, and races.
This article has touched on some of the main elements of the philosophy of love. It reaches into many philosophical fields, notably theories of human nature, the self, and of the mind. The language of love, as it is found in other languages as well as in English, is similarly broad and deserves more attention.
Monday, March 2, 2009
EROS, PHILIA, and AGAPE
EROS
The term eros (Greek erasthai) is used to refer to that part of love constituting a passionate, intense desire for something, it is often referred to as a sexual desire, hence the modern notion of 'erotic' (Greek erotikos). In Plato's writings however, eros is held to be a common desire that seeks transcendental beauty-the particular beauty of an individual reminds us of true beauty that exists in the world of Forms or Ideas (Phaedrus 249E: "he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it." Trans. Jowett). The Platonic-Socratic position maintains that the love we generate for beauty on this earth can never be truly satisfied until we die; but in the meantime we should aspire beyond the particular stimulating image in front of us to the contemplation of beauty in itself. The implication of the Platonic theory of eros is that ideal beauty, which is reflected in the particular images of beauty we find, becomes interchangeable across people and things, ideas, and art: to love is to love the Platonic form of beauty- not a particular individual, but the element they posses of true (Ideal) beauty. Reciprocity is not necessary to Plato's view of love, for the desire is for the object (of Beauty), than for, say, the company of another and shared values and pursuits. Many in the Platonic vein of philosophy hold that love is an intrinsically higher value than appetitive or physical desire. Physical desire, they note, is held in common with the animal kingdom and hence of a lower order of reaction and stimulus than a rationally induced love, i.e., a love produced by rational discourse and exploration of ideas, which in turn defines the pursuit of Ideal beauty. Accordingly, the physical love of an object, an idea, or a person in itself is not be a proper form of love, love being a reflection of that part of the object, idea, or person, that partakes in Ideal beauty.
PHILIAIn contrast to the desiring and passionate yearning of eros, philia entails a fondness and appreciation of the other. For the Greeks, the term philia incorporated not just friendship, but also loyalties to family and polis-one's political community, job, or discipline. Philia for another may be motivated, as Aristotle explains in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, for the agent's sake or for the other's own sake. The motivational distinctions are derived from love for another because the friendship is wholly useful as in the case of business contacts, or because their character and values are pleasing (with the implication that if those attractive habits change, so too does the friendship), or for the other in who they are in themselves, regardless of one's interests in the matter. The English concept of friendship roughly captures Aristotle's notion of philia, as he writes: "things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are doneÖ" (Rhetoric, II. 4, trans. Rhys Roberts).
Aristotle elaborates on the kinds of things we seek in proper friendship, suggesting that the proper basis for philia is objective: those who share our dispositions, who bear no grudges, who seek what we do, who are temperate, and just, who admire us appropriately as we admire them, and so on. Philia could not emanate from those who are quarrelsome, gossips, aggressive in manner and personality, who are unjust, and so on. The best characters, it follows, may produce the best kind of friendship and hence love: indeed, how to be a good character worthy of philia is the theme of the Nicomachaen Ethics. The most rational man is he who would be the happiest, and he, therefore, who is capable of the best form of friendship, which between two "who are good, and alike in virtue" is rare (NE, VIII.4 trans. Ross). We can surmise that love between such equalsAristotle's rational and happy men- would be perfect, with circles of diminishing quality for those who are morally removed from the best. He characterizes such love as "a sort of excess of feeling". (NE, VIII.6) Friendships of a lesser quality may also be based on the pleasure or utility that is derived from another's company. A business friendship is based on utility--on mutual reciprocity of similar business interests; once the business is at an end, then the friendship dissolves. Similarly with those friendships based on the pleasure that is derived from the other's company, which is not a pleasure enjoyed for who the other person is in himself, but in the flow of pleasure from his actions or humour. The first condition for the highest form Aristotelian love is that a man loves himself.
Without an egoistic basis, he cannot extend sympathy and affection to others (NE, IX.8). Such self-love is not hedonistic, or glorified, depending on the pursuit of immediate pleasures or the adulation of the crowd, it is instead a reflection of his pursuit of the noble and virtuous, which culminate in the pursuit of the reflective life. Friendship with others is required "since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actionsÖto live pleasantlyÖsharing in discussion and thought" as is appropriate for the virtuous man and his friend (NE, IX.9). The morally virtuous man deserves in turn the love of those below him; he is not obliged to give an equal love in return, which implies that the Aristotelian concept of love is elitist or perfectionist: "In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he loves." (NE, VIII, 7,). Reciprocity, although not necessarily equal, is a condition of Aristotelian love and friendship, although parental love can involve a one-sided fondness.
The universalist command to "love thy neighbor as thyself" refers the subject to those surrounding him, whom he should love unilaterally if necessary. The command employs the logic of mutual reciprocity, and hints at an Aristotelian basis that the subject should love himself in some appropriate manner: for awkward results would ensue if he loved himself in a particularly inappropriate, perverted manner! (Philosophers can debate the nature of 'self-love' implied in this-from the Aristotelian notion that self-love is necessary for any kind of inter-personal love, to the condemnation of egoism and the impoverished examples that pride and self-glorification from which to base one's love of another. St Augustine relinquishes the debate--he claims that no command is needed for a man to love himself (De bono viduitatis, xxi.) Analogous to the logic of "it is better to give than to receive", the universalism of agape requires an initial invocation from someone: in a reversal of the Aristotelian position, the onus for the Christian is on the morally superior to extend love to others. Nonetheless, the command also entails an egalitarian love- hence the Christian code to "love thy enemies" (Matthew 5:44- 45). Such love transcends any perfectionist or aristocratic notions that some are (or should be) more loveable than others. Agape finds echoes in the ethics of Kant and Kierkegaard, who assert the moral importance of giving impartial respect or love to another person qua human being in the abstract.
However, loving one's neighbor impartially (James 2:9) invokes serious ethical concerns, especially if the neighbor ostensibly does not warrant love. Debate thus begins on what elements of a neighbor's conduct should be included in agape, and which should be excluded. Early Christians asked whether the principle applied only to disciples of Christ or to all. The impartialists won the debate asserting that the neighbor's humanity provides the primary condition of being loved; nonetheless his actions may require a second order of criticisms, for the logic of brotherly love implies that it is a moral improvement on brotherly hate. For metaphysical dualists, loving the soul rather than the neighbor's body or deeds provides a useful escape clause-or in turn the justification for penalizing the other's body for sin and moral transgressions, while releasing the proper object of love-the soul-from its secular torments. For Christian pacifists, "turning the other cheek" to aggression and violence implies a hope that the aggressor will eventually learn to comprehend the higher values of peace, forgiveness, and a love for humanity.
The universalism of agape runs counter to the partialism of Aristotle and poses a variety of ethical implications. Aquinas admits a partialism in love towards those we are related while maintaining that we should be charitable to all, whereas others such as Kierkegaard insist on impartiality. Recently, LaFallotte has noted that to love those one is partial towards is not necessarily a negation of the impartiality principle, for impartialism could admit loving those closer to one as an impartial principle, and, employing Aristotle's conception of self-love, iterates that loving others requires an intimacy that can only be gained from being partially intimate ("Personal Relations", Blackwell Companion to Ethics). Others would claim that the concept of universal love, of loving all equally, is not only impracticable, but logically emptyAristotle, for example, argues: "One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person)" (NE,
VIII.6).
The Nature of Love: Eros, Philia, and Agape
The philosophical discussion regarding love logically begins with questions concerning its nature. This implies that love has a 'nature', a proposition that some may oppose arguing that love is conceptually irrational, in the sense that it cannot be described in rational or meaningful propositions. For such critics, who are presenting a metaphysical and epistemological argument, love may be an ejection of emotions that defy rational examination; on the other hand, some languages, such as Papuan do not even admit the concept, which negates the possibility of a philosophical examination. In English, the word 'love', which is derived from Germanic forms of the Sanskrit lubh (desire), is broadly defined and hence imprecise, which generates first order problems of definition and meaning, which are resolved to some extent by the reference to the Greek terms, eros, philia, and agape.
Philosophy of Love
The philosophical treatment of love transcends a variety of subdisciplines including epistemology, metaphysics, religion, human nature, politics and ethics. Often statements or arguments concerning love, its nature and role in human life
for example, connect to one or all the central theories of philosophy, and is often compared with, or examined in the context of, the philosophies of sex and gender. The task of a philosophy of love is to present the appropriate issues in a cogent manner, drawing on relevant theories of human nature, desire, ethics, and so on. This brief introduction examines the nature of love and some of the ethical and political
ramifications.
Saturday, February 28, 2009
Philosophy of Sex
I don't think the attributions are true, but these are pretty funny nonetheless:
"I believe that sex is one of the most beautiful, natural, wholesome things that money can buy." --Tom Clancy
"You know "that look" women get when they want sex? Me neither." --Steve Martin
"Having sex is like playing bridge. If you don't have a good partner, you'd better have a good hand." --Woody Allen
"Bisexuality immediately doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night." --Rodney Dangerfield
"There are a number of mechanical devices which increase sexual arousal, particularly in women. Chief among these is the Mercedes-Benz 380SL." --Lynn Lavner (this one I think is great)
"Leaving sex to the feminists is like letting your dog vacation at the taxidermist." --Matt Barry
"Sex at age 90 is like trying to shoot pool with a rope." --Camille Paglia
"Sex is one of the nine reasons for reincarnation. The other eight are unimportant." --George Burns
"Women might be able to fake orgasms. But men can fake whole relationships." --Sharon Stone
"My girlfriend always laughs during sex---no matter what she's reading." --Steve Jobs (Founder, Apple Computers)
"My mother never saw the irony in calling me a son-of-a-bitch." --Jack Nicholson
"Clinton lied. A man might forget where he parks or where he lives, but he never forgets oral sex, no matter how bad it is." --Barbara Bush (Former US First Lady, and you didn't think Barbara had a sense of
humor)
"Ah, yes, divorce, from the Latin word meaning to rip out a man's genitals through his wallet." --Robin Williams
"Women complain about premenstrual syndrome, but I think of it as the only time of the month that I can be myself." --Roseanne
"Women need a reason to have sex. Men just need a place." --Billy Crystal
"According to a new survey, women say they feel more comfortable undressing in front of men than they do undressing in front of other women. They say that women are too judgmental, where, of course, men are just grateful." --Robert De Niro
"There's a new medical crisis. Doctors are reporting that many men are having allergic reactions to latex condoms. They say they cause severe swelling. So what's the problem?" --Dustin Hoffman
"There's very little advice in men's magazines, because men think, I know what I'm doing. Just show me somebody naked." --Jerry Seinfeld
"Instead of getting married again, I'm going to find a woman I don't like and just give her a house." --Rod Stewart
"See, the problem is that God gives men a brain and a penis, and only enough blood to run one at a time." --Robin Williams
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Philosophy and Pornography: Juliet or Justine?
Written in the context of the ongoing Parliamentary Debate in the United Kingdom on the banning of the possession of extreme pornography with a maximum penalty of five years. Many have questioned the relevance of philosophy of late, as the stagnant image they abide, captivates, sours, freezes their minds, and keeps them from what they have been made to believe is the bad side of town.
We are talking about dark, hidden ‘forces’, those underneath Bildung, education, discipline and breeding, the medical doctor, psychiatrist, jailer, surveillance, (too bad for Mill, but maybe not for Bentham) as they orchestrate a situation of archetypes and techniques for the reproduction of the Same.
Yet, in our context, the bad side is the current official establishment, and not the other bad side, the resistance that is the ceaseless spectre of an ever deepening topos of questioning. We must throw our existence into question. We must become bad, and in the right way…
There is a deeper topos, not all at once or as an accumulation – existence itself seeks instead to lay out a place for be-ing and expression, communication - to the exclusion, in each case, of the established arche and its culture of hegemony.
It is perhaps philosophy, as with no other field of study, that could address our concerns with respect to the overwhelming transformations of human sexuality and existence, since the agricultural and industrial revolutions, but especially in the last fifty, twenty, ten, five, one year(s), amid this -
Yet, it does not whisper a word in its sanitized corridors (except for stale references to Foucault, the dusty fate to which even Bataille will not escape) upon the forbidden depths of human sexuality (it leaves that to the diaspora in the other disciplines and to popular culture).
Indeed, there are, to this very moment, epistemological and existential taboos surrounding questions of ‘our’ sexuality. Is that which is disclosed an aspect of our ‘nature’ or existence, and how are we to respond to this revelation of ‘ourselves’? Of course, the question of the eroticisation of one’s own subordination should be explored, but this is a topic that cannot be addressed in the terms of morality or amid the current sexual aesthetics.
To a significant extent, this question exposes the tactical and strategic implications of the internet (technology in the sense of Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology), in the dissemination of the ‘ghost’ of sexuality per se (Derrida) –
Foucault would have loved the internet, the dimension of the ghost, sex and death.
This awakens the questions of death and eroticism. Such a question and disclosure begins to upstage modernity – as an echo, an aspect, thread, culture, discursive formation, iconography of these pre-historical and post-historical ‘ways of life’.
Philosophy had long made a theme of eros, in Empedocles and Plato (the Symposium, for instance), Aristotle, Augustine, Eckhart, Bruno, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bataille, Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Wittgenstein, Kristeva, Iriguray, to name only a few – not mention poets and artists (including film makers) who are inexorably intertwined in this grand conversation/contestation amid our strange existence.
Each of these is trying to say that our lives are more than laws enacted by whatever current arche, theory, state, government, tribe - that our desire is insurmountable, and must be acknowledged as a force in our discussions. It would seem that having acknowledged eroticism as a form of life (as an unimpeachable aspect of the human condition), and as expression as art and intimate practises, philosophy would turn to pornography, erotic art and sexual practises in a similar manner. Indeed, it could well be argued that pornography is a genre of art, even if, low art. But, the opinion on pornography has been mixed between a small smattering of advocates, those who oppose it, and those who either tolerate or consume it.
Yet, when did low art lose its appeal? Did the internet come too late? Or, does it not swallow low art, give it a place for expression, but one of no consequence? Such a terrain compels the philosopher to begin to deal with the underground events behind the mask of aesthetics and the ‘industry’, amid the body (which is not that of the mind), culture, the soul – and the criticisms of pornography from a moral, ethical or political basis. Of course, there are also many free spirits who embrace pornography as a means of liberation and expression (Cf. Klossowski, Bellmer), and this includes all of the various sub-genres of pornography, including the most ‘extreme’.
We are familiar with these battles and ceaselessly hear everyone’s best lines on the matter. Yet, as many of ‘us’ feel compromised even dealing with this topic, not to mention mere eroticism, not to mention pornography and extreme pornography, it seems that there has been erected, ironically – or perhaps tragically - a barrier to research into contemporary sexual existence and expression as the guilty conscience of the researcher. This could be symptomatic of a culture of weakness, as we could discern easily enough from Nietzsche.
‘We’ recoil amid the dark depths of our enlightenment.
Indeed, if the law which is being discussed is passed, this would mean that an intellectual researcher of eroticism and ‘pornography’ (as expressions of human sexual existence) would be criminalised. The fact that this present, my very writing now (and you become complicit as you read) may be criminalised or held suspect (if it is not already so) in less than a months time is quite disturbing.
We may think of Foucault in this context, in relation to the exposure of a truth regime to its existence as conflict, and should expand our reflections upon this matter in a serious manner – and act
the deed is all ..
Behind all of this chatter, expression and politik about sexuality, gender, eroticism, pornography, sexual violence, there lies an unarticulated question – and one that genuinely seduces us into an abyss.
An un-important question distracts us: What are ‘they’ trying to hide? Yet, each of us already always knows and feels what ‘they’ try to hide, ‘in’ their idle chatter and gossip. Each of us is complicit in the secret, we, each of us, knows what we are trying to hide.Yet, should we bother to hide it? Indeed, it is upon this sexual topography that we build our world. Yet, we can still articulate the question:
Do not these images and films indicate a depth to the human creature, and, are these images and films not indicative of the primal desires (even if extreme) that are felt, imagined or expressed amid the human condition, not as deviations to be tolerated, but regarded as authentic desires and narratives with respect to the event, flux, of human, finite, existence?
Is it possible that an exploration of our more darker sides will enlighten us as to the authentic meaning of our finite existence?
Shall we be Juliet or Justine?
(James Aire)
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