I don't think the attributions are true, but these are pretty funny nonetheless:
"I believe that sex is one of the most beautiful, natural, wholesome things that money can buy." --Tom Clancy
"You know "that look" women get when they want sex? Me neither." --Steve Martin
"Having sex is like playing bridge. If you don't have a good partner, you'd better have a good hand." --Woody Allen
"Bisexuality immediately doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night." --Rodney Dangerfield
"There are a number of mechanical devices which increase sexual arousal, particularly in women. Chief among these is the Mercedes-Benz 380SL." --Lynn Lavner (this one I think is great)
"Leaving sex to the feminists is like letting your dog vacation at the taxidermist." --Matt Barry
"Sex at age 90 is like trying to shoot pool with a rope." --Camille Paglia
"Sex is one of the nine reasons for reincarnation. The other eight are unimportant." --George Burns
"Women might be able to fake orgasms. But men can fake whole relationships." --Sharon Stone
"My girlfriend always laughs during sex---no matter what she's reading." --Steve Jobs (Founder, Apple Computers)
"My mother never saw the irony in calling me a son-of-a-bitch." --Jack Nicholson
"Clinton lied. A man might forget where he parks or where he lives, but he never forgets oral sex, no matter how bad it is." --Barbara Bush (Former US First Lady, and you didn't think Barbara had a sense of
humor)
"Ah, yes, divorce, from the Latin word meaning to rip out a man's genitals through his wallet." --Robin Williams
"Women complain about premenstrual syndrome, but I think of it as the only time of the month that I can be myself." --Roseanne
"Women need a reason to have sex. Men just need a place." --Billy Crystal
"According to a new survey, women say they feel more comfortable undressing in front of men than they do undressing in front of other women. They say that women are too judgmental, where, of course, men are just grateful." --Robert De Niro
"There's a new medical crisis. Doctors are reporting that many men are having allergic reactions to latex condoms. They say they cause severe swelling. So what's the problem?" --Dustin Hoffman
"There's very little advice in men's magazines, because men think, I know what I'm doing. Just show me somebody naked." --Jerry Seinfeld
"Instead of getting married again, I'm going to find a woman I don't like and just give her a house." --Rod Stewart
"See, the problem is that God gives men a brain and a penis, and only enough blood to run one at a time." --Robin Williams
Saturday, February 28, 2009
Philosophy of Sex
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Philosophy and Pornography: Juliet or Justine?
Written in the context of the ongoing Parliamentary Debate in the United Kingdom on the banning of the possession of extreme pornography with a maximum penalty of five years. Many have questioned the relevance of philosophy of late, as the stagnant image they abide, captivates, sours, freezes their minds, and keeps them from what they have been made to believe is the bad side of town.
We are talking about dark, hidden ‘forces’, those underneath Bildung, education, discipline and breeding, the medical doctor, psychiatrist, jailer, surveillance, (too bad for Mill, but maybe not for Bentham) as they orchestrate a situation of archetypes and techniques for the reproduction of the Same.
Yet, in our context, the bad side is the current official establishment, and not the other bad side, the resistance that is the ceaseless spectre of an ever deepening topos of questioning. We must throw our existence into question. We must become bad, and in the right way…
There is a deeper topos, not all at once or as an accumulation – existence itself seeks instead to lay out a place for be-ing and expression, communication - to the exclusion, in each case, of the established arche and its culture of hegemony.
It is perhaps philosophy, as with no other field of study, that could address our concerns with respect to the overwhelming transformations of human sexuality and existence, since the agricultural and industrial revolutions, but especially in the last fifty, twenty, ten, five, one year(s), amid this -
Yet, it does not whisper a word in its sanitized corridors (except for stale references to Foucault, the dusty fate to which even Bataille will not escape) upon the forbidden depths of human sexuality (it leaves that to the diaspora in the other disciplines and to popular culture).
Indeed, there are, to this very moment, epistemological and existential taboos surrounding questions of ‘our’ sexuality. Is that which is disclosed an aspect of our ‘nature’ or existence, and how are we to respond to this revelation of ‘ourselves’? Of course, the question of the eroticisation of one’s own subordination should be explored, but this is a topic that cannot be addressed in the terms of morality or amid the current sexual aesthetics.
To a significant extent, this question exposes the tactical and strategic implications of the internet (technology in the sense of Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology), in the dissemination of the ‘ghost’ of sexuality per se (Derrida) –
Foucault would have loved the internet, the dimension of the ghost, sex and death.
This awakens the questions of death and eroticism. Such a question and disclosure begins to upstage modernity – as an echo, an aspect, thread, culture, discursive formation, iconography of these pre-historical and post-historical ‘ways of life’.
Philosophy had long made a theme of eros, in Empedocles and Plato (the Symposium, for instance), Aristotle, Augustine, Eckhart, Bruno, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bataille, Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Wittgenstein, Kristeva, Iriguray, to name only a few – not mention poets and artists (including film makers) who are inexorably intertwined in this grand conversation/contestation amid our strange existence.
Each of these is trying to say that our lives are more than laws enacted by whatever current arche, theory, state, government, tribe - that our desire is insurmountable, and must be acknowledged as a force in our discussions. It would seem that having acknowledged eroticism as a form of life (as an unimpeachable aspect of the human condition), and as expression as art and intimate practises, philosophy would turn to pornography, erotic art and sexual practises in a similar manner. Indeed, it could well be argued that pornography is a genre of art, even if, low art. But, the opinion on pornography has been mixed between a small smattering of advocates, those who oppose it, and those who either tolerate or consume it.
Yet, when did low art lose its appeal? Did the internet come too late? Or, does it not swallow low art, give it a place for expression, but one of no consequence? Such a terrain compels the philosopher to begin to deal with the underground events behind the mask of aesthetics and the ‘industry’, amid the body (which is not that of the mind), culture, the soul – and the criticisms of pornography from a moral, ethical or political basis. Of course, there are also many free spirits who embrace pornography as a means of liberation and expression (Cf. Klossowski, Bellmer), and this includes all of the various sub-genres of pornography, including the most ‘extreme’.
We are familiar with these battles and ceaselessly hear everyone’s best lines on the matter. Yet, as many of ‘us’ feel compromised even dealing with this topic, not to mention mere eroticism, not to mention pornography and extreme pornography, it seems that there has been erected, ironically – or perhaps tragically - a barrier to research into contemporary sexual existence and expression as the guilty conscience of the researcher. This could be symptomatic of a culture of weakness, as we could discern easily enough from Nietzsche.
‘We’ recoil amid the dark depths of our enlightenment.
Indeed, if the law which is being discussed is passed, this would mean that an intellectual researcher of eroticism and ‘pornography’ (as expressions of human sexual existence) would be criminalised. The fact that this present, my very writing now (and you become complicit as you read) may be criminalised or held suspect (if it is not already so) in less than a months time is quite disturbing.
We may think of Foucault in this context, in relation to the exposure of a truth regime to its existence as conflict, and should expand our reflections upon this matter in a serious manner – and act
the deed is all ..
Behind all of this chatter, expression and politik about sexuality, gender, eroticism, pornography, sexual violence, there lies an unarticulated question – and one that genuinely seduces us into an abyss.
An un-important question distracts us: What are ‘they’ trying to hide? Yet, each of us already always knows and feels what ‘they’ try to hide, ‘in’ their idle chatter and gossip. Each of us is complicit in the secret, we, each of us, knows what we are trying to hide.Yet, should we bother to hide it? Indeed, it is upon this sexual topography that we build our world. Yet, we can still articulate the question:
Do not these images and films indicate a depth to the human creature, and, are these images and films not indicative of the primal desires (even if extreme) that are felt, imagined or expressed amid the human condition, not as deviations to be tolerated, but regarded as authentic desires and narratives with respect to the event, flux, of human, finite, existence?
Is it possible that an exploration of our more darker sides will enlighten us as to the authentic meaning of our finite existence?
Shall we be Juliet or Justine?
(James Aire)
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Political Philosophy of Machiavelli: Aphorisms from Art of War
- A battle that you win cancels any other bad action of yours. In the same way, by losing one, all the good things worked by you before become vain.
- Since the handling of arms is a beautiful spectacle, it is delightful to young men.
- Knowing how to fight made men more bold, because no one fears doing what it seems to him he has learned to do. Therefore, the ancients wanted their citizens to be trained in every warlike action.
- When they remain in garrison, soldiers are maintained with fear and punishment; when they are then led to war, with hope and reward.
- Without doubt, ferocious and disordered men are much weaker than timid and ordered ones. For order chases fear from men and disorder lessens ferocity.
- Never lead your soldiers to battle if you have not first confirmed their spirit and known them to be without fear and ordered; and never test them except when you see that they hope to win.
- Every little advantage is of great moment when men have to come to blows.
- To know in war how to recognize an opportunity and seize it is better than anything else.
- In the armies, and among every ten men, there must be one of more life, of more heart, or at least of more authority, who with his spirit, with his words, and with his example keeps the others firm and disposed to fight.
- In war, discipline can do more than fury.
- Sometimes it has been of great moment while the fight is going on, to disseminate words that pronounce the enemies' captain to be dead, or to have been conquered by another part of the army. Many times this has given victory to him who used it.
- It is much better to tempt fortune where it can favor you than to see your certain ruin by not tempting it.
- There is nothing as likely to succeed as what the enemy believes you cannot attempt.
- The greatest remedy that is used against a plan of the enemy is to do voluntarily what he plans that you do by force.
- You must never believe that the enemy does not know how to conduct his own affairs. Indeed, if you want to be deceived less and want to bear less danger, the more the enemy is weak or the less the enemy is cautious, so much more must you esteem him.
- The forces of adversaries are more diminished by the loss of those who flee than of those who are killed.
- And above all you ought to guard against leading an army to fight which is afraid or which is not confident of victory. For the greatest sign of an impending loss is when one does not believe one can win.
- Necessities can be many, but the one that is stronger is that which constrains you to win or to die.
- Present wars impoverish the lords that win as much as those that lose.
- War makes thieves, and peace hangs them.
Filsafat Politik Machiavelli: Manusia dan Keinginan untuk Berkuasa
Zaman Renaissance
Perkembangan baru ilmu pengetahuan, sastra, seni, dan hidup sosial. Manusia mulai berpikir secara baru, termasuk juga tentang dirinya. Manusia sebagai Faber Mundi (orang yang berbuat di dunia). Kekuasaan tidak lagi atas dasar kriteria agama atau moralitas tetapi atas dasar kriteria politik.
Ciri modern pemikiran Niccolo Machiavelli:
Machiavelli tidak memulai berfilsafat dengan mengajukan definisi-definisi. Tetapi menganalisa manusia dahulu dengan sifat dan kecenderungan alamiahnya kemudian berangkat menuju analisa kekuasaan. Kemantapan dan kejayaan komunitas politik satu bangsa, bangsa Italia
Ia mengemukakan “apa yang nyata-nyata”, bukan “apa yang sepatutnya” ada. Manusia alamiah adalah manusia yang mempunyai nafsu menaklukkan. Manusia itu umumnya mempunyai sifat-sifat negatif. Ada kelihaian dan ketegangan
Machiavelli mengutamakan tindakan dan tendensi “naluri” manusia:
Tindakan: Manusia yang mempunyai nafsu menaklukkan, tidak tahu terima kasih, plin plan, sesat, mau untungnya sendiri, takut menghadapi bahaya
Tendensi: Manusia yang bangga diri, mudah menipu dirinya sendiri, sehingga sulit melepaskan diri dari penyakit ini
Ada 2 bentuk negara: Republik dan Monarki (The Prince, bab 1, hal. 53)
Dari 2 bentuk negara ini, Negara Monarki-lah yang paling baik. Negara membutuhkan kekuasaan untuk mencapai tujuannya. Kesatuan dan kejayaan negara ditentukan oleh kekuasaan yang stabil dan kekuasaan yang stabil ditentukan oleh penguasa yang cerdik.
Penguasa yang cerdik: Tahu menggunakan cara-cara binatang dan cara-cara manusia (The Prince, bab 18, hal. 99)
Tidak boleh takut sedikitpun menghadapi tuduhan melakukan kejahatan, kalau kejahatan itu perlu dilakukan demi keselamatan negara (The Prince, bab 15, hal. 92)
Moralitas dan Politik Dua (2) Wilayah yang berbeda
Pengalaman menunjukkan bahwa para penguasa yang berhasil melakukan hal-hal yang besar adalah mereka yang menganggap gampang atas janji –janji mereka, mereka tahu bagaimana memperdayakan orang dengan kecerdikannya, dan yang akhirnya menang terhadap mereka yang memegang teguh prinsip-prinsip kejujuran (The Prince, bab18, hal. 99)
• Politik yang otonom: Membenarkan segala cara untuk mengamankan kekuasaan
Segala cara (tindakan dan perbuatan) yang bersifat licik, kejam, kriminal, amoral dapat dibenarkan sejauh itu dilakukan demi eksisnya negara
• Moralitas: Alat untuk mendukung kekuasaan
Baik bagi penguasa untuk mempunyai sifat-sifat baik (suka mengampuni, murah hati, jujur, manusiawi, ikhlas, alim) tetapi sewaktu-waktu jika dibutuhkan (dalam keadaan darurat), ia juga harus dapat berbuat yang sebaliknya (The Prince, bab 18, hal. 99)
Keterbatasan Machiavelli
Ada keterbatasan konsep tentang manusia, yaitu melihat manusia dari kelemahannya. Kelemahan manusia ini nantinya disempurnakan oleh Thomas Hobbes menjadi Teori Perjanjian Negara, Mengesampingkan nilai-nilai tata susila, agama, dan masyarakat karena terpaku pada kepentingan praktis, yaitu memberi pegangan bagi penguasa
Kesimpulan:
Pemikiran filsafat politik Machiavelli sangat kontroversi karena membebaskan filsafat politik dari belenggu masa lampau (peranan moralitas dalam politik). Dengan membebaskan politik dari moralitas maka dengan sendirinya politik menjadi suatu sistem nilai yang otonom, mandiri dan bebas dari sistem-sistem nilai yang lain. Pemikiran filsafat politik Machiavelli adalah amoral dan bukan imoral. Kepentingan Negara menjadi ukuran dan nilai tertinggi untuk mengambil dan menentukan kebijakan dalam kekuasaan.
Dreams and skepticism
Let us now explore what follows for philosophy from the view of dreaming as imagining. If that is the right model,then traditional formulations of radical skepticism, Descartes’ included, are not radical enough. The possibility that we dream now threatens not only our supposed perceptual knowledge but even our supposed introspective knowledge, our supposed takings of the given. It is now in doubt not only whether we see a fire, but even whether we think we see a fire, or experience as if we see it. How so? With my hand in view, I may ask: do I now think I see a hand? Well, might it not be just a dream? Might I not be only dreaming that I think I see a hand? If I am only dreaming, then I do not really think I see a hand, after all. If I do ask whether I think I see a hand, however, I cannot thereby be dreaming that I think I see a hand. If in my dream I ask myself a question, and answer it with a choice or an affirmation, the asking would seem to belong with the choice or the affirmation. If the latter belongs only in the dream, not in reality, the asking would also have its place in that same dream. So, again, if I really ask whether I think I see a hand, I cannot thereby be only dreaming that I think I see a hand. Is this not privileged access after all, protection from the possibility that it be just a dream?
Fair enough. But compare my question whether I see a hand. If I really ask whether I see a hand, I cannot thereby be dreaming about the hand and my seeing it. So, we seem to have similarly privileged access to the fact that we see a hand, at least similarly privileged in respect of protection from the dream argument. What might possibly make the cogito especially privileged? What could give it a status not shared by perception of the hand? One advantage at least it turns out not to enjoy: it enjoys no special protection from the possibility that one is only dreaming. The cogito has got to be different nonetheless from our knowledge of a hand we see. We might try to defend the cogito by retreating to a thinner, less committing, concept of thinking, where even dreaming and imagining are themselves forms of ‘‘thinking.’’ On the thicker notion of thinking, if I imagine that p, hypothesize that p, or dream that p, I do not thereby think that p; I may not even think that p at all. On the thinner notion of thinking, by contrast, in imagining that p one does thereby think that p.And the same is now true of dreaming.On the thinner notion, in dreaming that p, one does thereby think that p. More idiomatically, let’s say rather this: in dreaming or imagining that p, one has the thought that p. So, ‘‘thinking that p’’ in the thinner sense would amount to ‘‘having the thought that p,’’ a thought one can have even by just asking oneself whether p. compare (a) one’s affirming that one affirms something, with (b) one’s having (the thought) that one has a thought.The latter is also a self-verifying (thin) thought. But it has in addition something missing from the former: namely, being dream-proof. If one were now dreaming, one would affirm nothing. But one would still have the thought that one was having a thought.
So, my present thought that I am having a thought is not only guaranteed to be right; in addition, I would not so much as seem to have it without having it, not even if I were dreaming. Compare my affirming that I am affirming something. This too is guaranteed to be right. But, unlike the thinner thought, it could be mere appearance. I might right now be dreaming that I was affirming something, while in fact affirming nothing. So, things might in a way seem subjectively just as they do now, although I would just be dreaming: thoughts would be crossing my mind, without my really affirming anything. However, the more defensible thinner thought falls short crucially in the dialectic against the skeptic. It is not the sort of thought that suffices to constitute knowledge. Knowledge requires something thicker than merely having a thought. Accordingly, the move from thick thought to thin thought is not a way to save the cogito, after all. Consciously and affirmatively thinking that I think does have a special status: one could not go wrong in so thinking. It can thus attain high reliability and epistemic status. It attains this status through its being a conscious state of thinking that one thinks. Moreover, this status is not removed, or even much diminished, by the threat of an impostor state, one subjectively very much like it. A vivid and realistic dream is, of course, subjectively very much like its corresponding reality. Perhaps it is only in my dream that I now affirmatively think that I think. Despite being subjectively much like the state of thinking that one thinks, in dreaming one does not think; one does not so much as think that one thinks. That is to say, even if in one’s dream one affirmatively thinks that one thinks, this does not entail that in reality one so thinks that one thinks, while dreaming. Two states can thus be hard to distinguish subjectively, though in only one is the subject justified in thinking such and such. Of course the two states are constitutively different. One is an apparent state of thinking one thinks, doing so (thinking one thinks) only in a dream, so that it is really only a state of dreaming that one thinks one thinks. By contrast, the other is a state of thinking one thinks, doing so (thinking one thinks) in actuality. Only the latter yields justification for one’s thought that one thinks. The former not only yields no such justification: in it there is no such thought—this despite the fact that, by hypothesis, the two states are indistinguishable, as indistinguishable as is reality from a realistic enough dream. Have we here found a way to defend our perceptual knowledge from the skeptic’s dream argument? Even if we might just as easily be dreaming that we see a hand, this does not entail that we might now be astray in our perceptual beliefs. For, even if we might be dreaming, it does not follow that we might be thinking we see a hand on this same experiential basis, without seeing any hand. After all, in dreaming there is no real thinking and perhaps not even any real experiencing. So, even if I had now been dreaming, which might easily enough have happened, I would not thereby have been thinking that I see a hand, based on a corresponding phenomenal experience. That disposes of the threat posed by dreams for the safety of our beliefs. Does it dispose of the problem of dream skepticism? It does so if dreams create such a problem only by threatening the safety of our perceptual beliefs. Is that the only threat posed by dreams? We next take up this question.
Saturday, February 21, 2009
Hegel: Konsep dan Relasi Person dan Kehendak Bebas
Ada aneka pandangan terhadap Hegel. Dalam tataran sejarah perkembangan filsafat terutama dalam perspektif metafisik person diartikan sebagai kesatuan substansial dari tubuh dan jiwa, sebagai dimensi psiko-fisik, sebagai dimensi ontologisnya. Dalam hal ini tubuh dilihat sebagai ekspresi derajad kemanusiaan, berhargam dan bernilai, tidak pernah menjadi atau direduksi ke dalam nilai pasar yang dapat diperjualbelikan. Asumsi yang demikian bertitik tolak dari pandangan bahwa person secara total dan esensial identik dengan tubuhnya. Akan tetapi ada anggapan bahwa tubuh itu juga merupakan materi, kuburan dan penjara bagi sesuatu yang tidak dapat mati. Tetapi dalam pandangan modern, tubuh adalah prinsip material dari individuasi dan dilihat dalam kerangka fungsi instrumentalnya. Manusia lantas tidak menjadi tubuh tetapi menjadi objek harta milik.
Pengertian Hegel terhadap person dan seluruh penjelasannya rupanya merupakan sontoh paham modern tetang pribadi itu sendiri. Ia misalnya mendefinisikan kepribadian sebagai kapasitas untuk membuat suatu abstraksi dari semua penentuan dan kondisi-kondisi yang mempengaruhi pemikiran sebagaimana adanya yang terjadi pada kehendak. Tubuh dalam hal ini dilihat sebagai kondisi eksternal. Selanjutnya person dapat dan harus memiliki tubuhnya sendiri. Oleh karena itu direduksikan ke dalam eksistensi fenomenal. Tubuh lalu menjadi milik person, adalah cermin dan instrument aktivitas kebebasannya. Person kemudian menjadi tuan bagi dirinya.
Pada level roh subjektif, adanya person didahului oleh jiwa, oleh kesadaran atau kesadaran diri, dan pada akhirnya adalah moment kehendak bebas. Pada tingkat roh objektif, relasi antara person dengan tubuhyna diletakkkan dalam dialektika kemajuan yang menunjukkan bagaimana person dalam aktivitasnya secara konstant dan perlu dibatasi pada bidang alamiah sebagaimana itu berbeda dari bentuk-bentuk hidup sosial dan politis. Dalam bidang hukum tubuh itu perlu secara “artifisial” dikaitkan dengan suatu tindakan partikular kehendak yang ditempatkan dalam konteks pengakuan hukum. Pada level ini, person tidak dapat mengabstrasikan dari level alamiah dan presuposisi fisik. Tubuh mesti diakui sebagai sesuatu yang konstitutif bagi kepribadian yang bebas. Konsep person merupakan tempat lahir bagi subjektivitas, kebebasan abstrak dan dilihat sebagai kapasitas tertinggi dari semua abstraksi semua isi bahkan dari apa yang adalah milik kita. Hegel lantas berpendapat bahwa idea kebebasan perlu direalisasi ke dalam dunia objektif. Dalam hal ini tubuh kemudian menjadi yang paling pertama dan segera merupakan alasan subjektif tentang dunia objektif. Pada sisi lain tubuh adalah mediasi dan merupakan unsur pembangun dari kondisi intersubjektif. Dengan demikian tubuh person dilihat sebagai “being-for-other” dari kepribadian. Hal ini mewakili aneka proposisi “pengakuan”.
Daram Philosophy of Right tubuh diletakkan dalam kaitannya dengan kepribadian. Meskipun secara logis person mengatasi tubuh, hal tersebut hanyalah suatu identifikasi antara person dan tubuh yang membenarkan dialektika dari roh objektif.
Pada tataran ini, tubuh diletakkan sejajar dengan person dan karena itu menjaminnya pada suatu tingkat status ontologis yang mengatasi semua hal alamiah. Yang alamiah sebagaimana penentuan-penentuan alamiah tubuh adalah apa yang meletakkan kemungkinan membatasi tindakan bebas person sebagai subjek “hukum” dan meletakkan dasar relasi intersubjektif antara person-person. Hasil gerakan logis ini adalah perwakilan dari tubuh sebagai objek kepemilikan atau menjadi person dan kemudia adalah subjek hukum itu sendiri. Berangkat dari sinilah, Hegel kemudian menjelaskan transisi dari kepemilikan kepada kontrak. Klaim bahwa person itu memiliki tubuh dalam harta milik mengantar seseorang kepada pengakuan bahwa tubuh adalah subjek hukum. Hal ini secara mutual berada dalam konteks kontrak. Sebab di dalam kontrak inilah masing-masing person saling menghargai.
Konsep filsafat hukum juga berkaitan dengan person. Problem dari filsafat hukum berhubungan dengan tema subjektifitas yang dapat berkembang dalam bentuk-bentuk berbeda dan figur-figur aktualitas roh. Di sini pengertian kehendak menjadi penting. Hegel, dalam uraian awalnya pada konsep roh subjektif menerangkan momen terakhir dari roh subjektif adalah kehendak bebas. Akan tetapi pada momen ini, kehendak tidak sungguh-sungguh bebas di dalam subjek yang terbatas karena kebebasa adalh aktualisasi diri dan perwujudan diri dari konsep dalam element eksistensi. Oleh karena itu, agar berada dalam kebebasan objetifnya, kehendak mesti mengambil bentuk sukesifnya. Moment pertama adalah person. Hegel menerangkan pula pemikirnanya untuk mengidetifikasi person itu. ada dua metode yang ditawarkannya. Pertama, karena filsafat pengetahuan tentang hukum memiliki idea tetang hukum sebagai objek, metode tersebut harus mengikuti perkembangan momen dari penentuan “konsep hukum” dan aktualisasinya. Kedua, penjelasan filsafat mesti menghadirkan figur konkret yang setiap waktu berkoresponden dengan moment-moment berbeda dari konsep yang adalah universalitas, partikularitas, dan individualitas. Hegel mengidentifikasi permulaan pengetahuan hukum dengan tugas pengembangan struktur-struktur kehendak menurut tiga moment konsep. Sekarang konsep kehendak adalah kebebasan. Kebebasan adalah substansi kehendak. Kehendak ditentukan oleh kebebasan utuk menemukan suatu Dasein dalam mana ia mewujudkan dirinya. Kehendak bebas ini merupakan bentuk pertama dari kebebasan yang mengaktualkan dirinya. Dalam konteks Abstract Right, kehendak bebas adalah moment pertama dari konsep-konsep momen individualitasnya. Dalam partikularitasnya, kehendak diperhitungkan ke depan dengan segera memberi dunia pertama dari kebebasan yang aktual di mana ia menyatakan tujuan dan maksud-maksudnya. Person merupakan idea yang secara total menentukan kondisi-kondisi empiris.
Langkah pertama untuk mengenal bahwa dalam bidang hukum kehendak bebas memiliki eksistensi dalam figus yuridis person. Langkah lainnga adalah dalam dan melalui diriyna sebagai milik dirinya. Relasi ini justru adalah dasar bagi konsep kepemilikan. Konsep person oleh Hegel merupakan perintah hukum (par 36) ini dikatakan Hegel dalam dua klausa yakni pertama jadilah pribadimu sendiri. Hal ini diarahkan kepada masing-masing individu yang bebas. Kedua adalah hormatilah yang lain sebagai person. Yang dimaksudkan Hegel untuk setiap pribadi sebagai person. Yang dimaksud oleh Hegel di sini adalah pentingnya relasi dengan person lain dengan cara “being-for-other” yakni melalui dirinya dan objek kepemilikan. Di sini Hegel mengutip konsep Kant tentang kategori imperatif dalam bidang hukum. Agar dapat dimengerti dua bidang perintah itu, person “harus” menyediakan bagi dirinya suatu “bagian eksternal” dari kebebasannya. Ini akan mendapat bentuknya dalam dasein. Karena inisial keabstrakkannya, dasein dikualifikasikan sebagai “eksternal” untuk kehendak bebas dan oleh karena itu, dapat dipisahkan dan berbeda darinya (par.41). “bidang kebebasan” yang adalah hasil eksteriorisasinya adalah penentuan “kepemilikan”. Person bagi Hegel adalah pemilik harta milik itu. Kepemiliknan, bagi Hegel, lantas merupakan suatu yang esensial bagi status yuridis dari person; bahwa seorang person tidak memiliki harta milik adalah suatu yang contradictio in adjecto. Eksterioritas itu tmapak dalam barang-barang atau hal-hal yang menjadi kekayaan person agar ia menjadi benar-benar bebas sebagai person. Eksistensi ini kemudian dapat menjadi “yang lain” yang tunggal. “Lain” di sini menjadi mungkin karena pemisahan dari dirinya. Dalam hal ini, Hegel memaksudkan suatu alienasi pribadi seseorang atau person terhadap harta miliknya.
Hegel: Kerangka utama sistem filsafatnya
Kerangka filsafat Hegel dikategorikan ke dalam tiga bagian berikut ini. Pertama yakni filsafat logika, kedua yakni filsafat alam dan filsafat roh. Ketiganya merupakan momen-momen dalam keseluruhan proses perjalanan roh/ide/kehendak menuju pada kepenuhan dan kesadarannya yang absolut. Untuk mencapai pada kesadaran diri yang sepenuhnya, roh tersebut niscaya perlu mengejawantahkan dirinya secara dialektis dalam berbagai realitas material. Tema filsafat politik merupakan momen dalam tahap perkembangan filsafat roh, tepatnya dalam tahap perkembangan roh objektif. Perkembangan roh objektif ini terjadi dalam tiga tahap pula yakni hukum abstrak, moralitas dan kesusilaan. Roh/ide/kehendak yang berkembang itu akan mencapai kepenuhannya dalam tahap kesusilaan, yang mana di dalam tahap ini, roh akan melalui tiga fase perkembangan yakni keluarga, masyarakat sipil dan negara. Dalam negara inilah rasionalitas dan kebebasan inidividu menjadi mungkin dan tercapai; dalam negara pula, kebebasan individu menyatu dengan totalitas kebebasan yang absolut.
Hal yang tidak terpisahkan dari penjelasan dan uraian Hegel tentang kepemilikan tidak terlepas dari konsepnya tentang kehendak bebas. Hampir seluruh filsafatnya bertitik tolak atau berdasarkan paham kebebasan ini. Dari sinilah ia merumuskan filsafatnya sebagai sejarah ynag berkembang ke arah kemerdekaan. Hal ini bagi Hegel tampak dalam tradisi Kristiani yang terjadi dalam komunitas jemaat perdana. Di dalam komunitas ini, paham subjektifitas itu sangat diperhatikan dan dijunjung tinggi. Manusia, dalam konsep ini dipandang sebagai persona yang bebas. Paham manusia yang bebas ini pula berkembang dan kemudian diteruskan dalam kenyataan sosial. Kenyataan tersebut bagi Hegel ditemukan dan tampak dalam revolusi Perancis yang dibawa oleh Napoleon Bonaparte.
Karl Marx: Agama Mengasingkan Diri Manusia
Marx sendiri meyakini bahwa masyarakat kapitalistik memang menawarkan terjadinya realisasi diri manusia, tetapi hal itu hanya terjadi bagi segelintir orang dan bukan bagi seluruh masyarakat. Marx kemudian menawarkan apa yang disebut dengan masyarakat komunis bahwa dalam masyarakat komunis setiap inidividu akan menikmati kehidupan yang aktif, kaya, dan bermakna; kendati hal itu berkait dengan hidup bersama, akan tetapi realisasi diri tetap dimungkinkan.
Dalam konteks alienasi, Marx membedakan setidaknya ada tiga hal yang harus disebut ketika orang berbicara tentang alienasi atau keterasingan yaitu alienasi sebagai tiadanya realisasi diri, sebagai tiadanya otonomi dan alienasi yang berkaitan dengan peran modal atas tenaga kerja. Namun di sini saya hanya akan mencoba memahami lebih dalam keterasingan yang diakui oleh Marx sebagai alienasi karena ketiadaan realsasi diri. Dikatakan oleh Marx bahwa dalam agama tidak ada bentuk realisasi diri yang sesungguhnya. Hal ini karena dalam agama manusia hanya boleh tunduk dan tidak terbuka bagi dialog yang memberikan kemungkinan bagi setiap individu untuk mengekspresikan dirinya. Agama tidak mengembangkan jati diri manusia secara utuh, karena manusia hanya tergantung pada otoritas semu yang diciptakannya sendiri.
Menurut Marx agama yang hanya mampu menghukum pemeluknya, pastilah agama ciptaan kaum kapitalis untuk menindas dan ‘meninabobokan’ orang-orang kecil dengan doktrin-doktrin kesalehan. Di mana dalam doktrin itu orang diharuskan hidup saleh dengan olah tapa yang berat dan menerima penderitaan dengan sukarela agar dapat memperoleh kemenangan di surga. Di sini Marx melihat bahwa hal itu hanya merupakan ciptaan masyarakat, khususnya disebut oleh Marx: masyarakat penguasa, untuk memperkuat hegemoni kekuasaannya terhadap masyarakat kecil yang dipimpinnya.
Tapi sebenarnya apa yang menjadi keprihatinan Marx? Jelas bahwa Marx melihat dalam tindakan agama semacam itu orang sangat tergantung pada ciptaannya sendiri. Manusia tidak otonom. Manusia harus tunduk pada ketentuan-ketentuan yang telah dibuatnya sendiri. Hal mana dapat dijelaskan seperti dalam proses produksi. Marx mengatakan bahwa dalam proses produksi setiap pekerja akan sangat dekat barang yang sedang dibuatnya, sehingga ia dengan leluasa dapat menyentuh dan memperlakukannya. Tetapi ketika barang itu berpindah tangan, sang pekerja itu tidak lagi berkuasa atas barang itu. Dalam agama, menurut Marx, ketika manusia masih hidup sebagai makhluk yang bebas –tanpa agama- ia dengan leluasa dapat membuat aturan-aturan, sanksi, ritus dan lain-lain; tetapi ketika ia masuk dan mulai meyakini suatu agama, manusia kemudian tunduk dengan aturan dan ritus yang dibuatnya sendiri. Pada saat itulah manusia terasing dari dirinya sendiri. Manusia melemparkan dirinya keluar dan tunduk atas ciptaannya sendiri, yang tidak lain adalah bayangan-bayangan indah dari makhluk yang menderita, yang merindukan otoritas yang melindunginya, tetapi yang terjadi justru sebaliknya bahwa otoritas itu semakin membelenggu dan menambah penderitaannya.
Di samping itu juga, Marx melihat bahwa agama memberikan pembebasan dari penindasan yakni dengan sikap pasrah. Inilah yang disebut oleh Marx sebagai sifat fetisisme dengan merujuk pada benda-benda material yang memiliki kekuatan supranatural. Marx mengatakan bahwa fetisisme agama itu muncul ketika ilusi-ilusi dalam kehidupan diangkat menjadi doktrin yang mau tidak mau harus ditaati oleh setiap individu. Fetisisme ini akan melahirkan apa yang disebut oleh Marx sebagai ‘harapan semu orang tertindas.’ Fetisisme agama membuat masyarakat tidak mampu bergerak dengan leluasa untuk membebaskan dirinya dari cengkeraman kemiskinan. Ini yang semakin memantapkan keyakinan Marx yang menyebut agama tidak lain sebagai candu masyarakat.
Karl Marx: Agama sebagai Candu Masyarakat
Bagi Marx, agama merupakan medium dari ilusi sosial. Dalam agama tidak ada pendasaran yang real-objektif bagi manusia untuk mengabdi pada kekuasaan supranatural. Ia justru melihat bahwa agama tidak berkembang karena ada kesadaran dari manusia akan pembebasan sejati namun karena kondisi yang diciptakan oleh orang-orang yang memiliki kuasa untuk melanggengkan kekuasaannya. Propaganda inilah yang disebutnya sebagai candu bagi masyarakat. Berkaitan dengan hal ini Marx mengkritik agama Kristen yang telah mempropagandakan etika ketertundukan. Dalam etika ketertundukan itu manusia hanya bisa tunduk terhadap segala aturan yang dilegitimasi sebagai aturan dari Allah. Manusia pasif dan menerima penderitaan sebagai karunia, sebagai sarana untuk mencapai kebahagiaan kekal. Ini mengindikasikan bahwa manusia akhirnya hanya bisa menerima penderitaannya tak berbuat apa-apa. Justru sikap tunduk inilah yang menguntungkan kaum kapitalis yang nota bene menguasai roda perekonomian. Dalam konteks ini Marx melihat bahwa agama adalah ekspresi langsung dari kelas yang berkepentingan, kelas yang dominan secara ekonomi bahkan politik yaitu kelas kapitalis.
Untuk itulah, Marx mengusulkan lahirnya masyarakat komunis. Dalam masyarakat komunis ini tidak ada lagi bentuk-bentuk penindasan kelas satu terhadap yang lain. Untuk mencapai cita-cita masyarakat komunis itu –yang dipandang olehnya sebagai suatu penghapusan stratifikasi sosial dalam masyarakat- agama harus sepi. Artinya agama harus dipinggirkan dan tidak mendominasi kehidupan masyarakat.
Kritik agama yang dilancarkan oleh Marx di atas sebenarnya merupakan langkah awal atau sebagai ‘pintu gerbang’ untuk memasuki wilayah kritik masyarakat. Bagi Marx, kritik agama tidak akan mengubah keadaan manusia yang menderita. Yang dibutuhkan adalah kritik masyarakat, agar agama tidak lahir. Dengan demikian, dapat dikatakan di sini bahwa kritik surga menjadi kritik dunia, kritik agama menjadi kritik hukum, dan kritik teologi menjadi kritik politik
Karl Marx: Agama Sebagai Instrumen Penindasan
Karl Marx menjelaskan bahwa tidak ada alasan lain bagi siapa pun bahwa orang harus menganut agama karena penderitaan dan penindasan. Keyakinan Marx ini, berangkat dari kritik agama Feurbach yaitu bahwa agama adalah institusi alienatif. Berangkat dari hal ini, Marx yakin bahwa orang menganut agama karena orang tersebut mengalami penderitaan dan penindasan dalam hidupnya. Penindasan yang dipahami oleh Marx adalah suatu perilaku eksploitatif-ekonomistik, di mana manusia dijadikan objek yang bisa dimanfaatkan untuk kepentingan tertentu. Marx yakin bahwa orang jatuh dalam kemiskinan karena tindakan-tindakan penindasan kepada mereka. Hal ini paling nyata dilakukan oleh para kapitalis. Dengan kata lain, kemiskinan itu disebabkan oleh struktur-struktur ekonomi masyarakat yang menindas, yang diciptakan oleh para kapitalis demi memperbesar modal mereka.
Berhadapan dengan struktur-struktur yang menindas dan memiskinan itu, orang tidak bisa berbuat lain kecuali pasrah dan akhirnya bersimpuh di hadapan Tuhan yang diciptakannya sendiri. Inilah yang disebut oleh Marx sebagai alienasi bahwa dalam agama alienasi itu terjadi karena manusia tunduk dan berada di bawah entitas suci yang diciptakannya sendiri. Dengan menciptakan Tuhan, dengan sendirinya manusia merendahkan martabatnya sendiri sehingga ia semakin asing dengan dirinya sendiri. Dengan demikian, agama tidak lain adalah instrumen penindas yang diciptakan manusia sendiri.
Berangkat dari perihal di atas, Marx kemudian menjelaskan bagaimana usaha agama untuk melestarikan diri. Agar dapat tetap exist, agama akan melanggengkan kemiskinan, kesengsaraan, dan perbudakan. Sehingga baginya agama hanya akan berakhir ketika kondisi-kondisi yang diperlukan untuk survivenya –kesengsaraan, kekuasaan kelas, eksploitasi komoditas- dihilangkan. Lalu muncul pertanyaan mengapa setiap masyarakat mempunyai agama? Marx menanggapinya demikian bahwa agama mendukung dan melayani kepentingan tertentu yang terkait denga dominasi kelas dan penundukan kelas. Dia menyebutkan bahwa agama dari sudut sosialitasnya adalah rengekan golongan masyarakat yang tertindas, sehingga baginya agama tidak lain adalah candu masyarakat.
RASIONALISME: Sebuah Epistemologi Pengetahuan di Barat
Ada dua sumber primer pengetahuan yang secara alamiah telah diperoleh manusia, yaitu akal dan pengalaman. Seluruh pengetahuan, tak terkecuali falsafah, senantiasa berkutat dalam dua sumber ini. Ada yang sangat mementingkan pengalaman, dan ada yang sebaliknya mementingkan akal. Bila kalangan yang mementingkan pengalaman dinilai sebagai empirisme, maka kalangan yang mementingkan akal itulah yang disebut rasionalisme. Meskipun tak jarang filosof berupaya mengompromikan dua sumber dan implikasinya itu, misalnya Immanuel Kant, namun pertentangan rasionalisme dan empirisme kiranya belum juga kunjung henti.
Rasionalisme, laiknya firqah-firqah lain dalam falsafah, ia dibangun tidak hanya oleh seorang filosof, dan tidak hanya dalam sebuah tempat atau kawasan. Rasionalisme dibangun oleh banyak filosof, di mana dari upaya-upaya berfalsafah mereka dapat disimpulkan sebuah kecenderungan (type) dasar berfalsafah yang disebut rasionalisme; rasionalisme dibangun di banyak kawasan dunia, di mana dari macam-macam pengaruh atau pertimbangan-pertimbangan kawasan itu, tetap dapat ditarik sebuah kecenderungan umum bernama rasionalisme.
Meskipun rasionalisme baru menemukan bentuk sistematisnya pada masa modern, namun sebenarnya varian-varian rasionalisme telah ada sejak masa klasik falsafah itu sendiri. Berkaitan dengan hal ini Prof. Dr. Ahmad Tafsir misalnya, menengarahi bahwa rasionalisme telah ada sejak zaman Thales, Socrates, Plato, Aristoteles, bahkan kalangan Sofis. Dia mengemukakan bahwa mereka, para filosof klasik, telah menerapkan rasionalisme dalam falsafah mereka.
Adalah Rene Descartes (1596-1650), selain disebut sebagai bapak filsafat modern, ia adalah bapak rasionalisme kontinental.Ide terkenalnya bahwa cogito ergo sum (Prancis: Je Pense, Donc Je Suis), telah menjadi tonggak awal bagi babak baru falsafah, yaitu era modern. Lewat ide itu pula ia ingin menegaskan bahwa hanya akal atau rasio yang dapat menjadi dasar falsafah, satunya-satunya dasar yang dapat dipercaya, dan bukan iman atau wahyu sebagaimana dipegangi oleh abad pertengahan.
Di samping Descartes, ada Baruch Spinoza atau Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677), dan Gotiefried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716). Nama-nama ini sebenarnya hanyalah nama-nama besar yang secara konsisten berusaha berfalsafah dengan kecenderungan rasionalisme. Artinya, tidak menutup kemungkinan akan ada banyak nama lain selain mereka yang juga berfalsafah dengan kecenderungan rasionalisme.
PENEGASAN ISTILAH
Sebuah ungkapan sederhana namun cukup representatif akan arti istilah rasionalisme ialah apa yang telah diungkapkan oleh F. Budi Hardiman, bahwa konsep rasionalisme mengacu pada sebuah aliran falsafah yang berpandangan bahwa pengetahuan (episteme) tidak didasarkan pada pengalaman empiris, melainkan pada asas-asas a-priori yang ada dalam rasio. Rasionalisme menghadirkan aksioma-aksioma, prinsip-prinsip atau definisi-definisi umum sebagai dasar atau titik tolak, sebelum akhirnya menjelaskan kenyataan atau memahami sesuatu. Sepaham dengan ini, ialah apa yang dikatakan oleh Prof. Dr. Ahmad Tafsir, bahwa “rasionalisme adalah paham filsafat yang mengatakan bahwa akal (reason) adalah alat terpenting dalam memperoleh pengetahuan dan mengetes pengetahuan.”
Sementara itu epistemologi, ia merupakan sebuah sub falsafah yang secara khusus berusaha menggeluti pertanyaan-pertanyaan menyeluruh dan mendasar tentang pengetahuan. Dengan sifatnya yang evaluatif, normatif dan kritis, epistemologi berusaha mengkaji dan menemukan ciri-ciri umum dan hakiki pengetahuan, serta mengkaji pengandaian-pengandaian dan syarat-syarat logis yang mendasari pengetahuan. Lantaran kapasitasnya itu, epistemologi merupakan upaya rasional untuk menimbang dan menentukan nilai kognitif pengalaman manusia.
Dengan demikian, rasionalisme sebagai sebuah epistemologi atau metode memperoleh pengetahuan, merupakan sebuah aliran falsafah yang ingin mengkaji seluk beluk pengetahuan, dengan menitikberatkan akal sebagai basis dan sumber pengetahuan itu sendiri.
IDE RASIONALISME
Dalam pandangan rasionalisme, sumber dan dasar pengetahuan adalah akal (reason). Kalangan rasionalis menyatakan bahwa akal itu universal dalam semua manusia, dan pemikiran (akal aktif) merupakan elemen penting manusia. Pemikiran merupakan satu-satunya instrumen kepastian pengetahuan, dan akal merupakan satu-satunya jalan untuk menentukan kebenaran atau kesalahan.
Bagi filosof rasionalis, pengetahuan yang dapat memenuhi syarat-syarat yang dituntut oleh semua pengetahuan ilmiah, adalah hanya pengetahuan yang diperoleh lewat akal. Dalam pandangan kaum rasionalis, akal dipahamai sebagai sejenis perantara khusus, di mana dengan akal kebenaran dapat dikenal dan ditemukan. Karena itu, kunci pengetahuan dan keabsahannya, bagi rasionalisme, adalah akal.
Dalam prosedur praksisnya, kalangan rasionalisme memulai dengan menghadirkan aksioma-aksioma, prinsip-prinsip atau definisi-definisi umum sebagai dasar atau titik tolak, sebelum akhirnya menjelaskan kenyataan atau memahami sesuatu. Aksioma-aksioma yang dipakai dasar pengetahuan itu, diturunkan dari ide yang dipandang sudah jelas, tegas, dan pasti dalam pikiran manusia.
Sebuah contoh sederhana yang sering digunakan kalangan rasionalis untuk mendeskripsikan sistem rasionalisme ialah, aksioma geometri. Bagi para rasionalis, aksioma geometri adalah ide yang jelas lagi tegas, yang dari aksioma itu dapat dideduksikan sebuah sistem yang terdiri dari subaksioma-subaksioma.
Misalnya sebuah aksioma geometri yang menyatakan bahwa, “garis lurus merupakan jarak terdekat antara dua titik.” Aksioma ini merupakan prinsip yang sudah ada dalam pikiran, yang dengan prinsip itu semua keadaan serupa dapat dijelaskan (baca: dideduksikan).
Secara khusus Rene Descartes mengetengahkan bahwa agar falsafah, termasuk epistemologi, dapat meraih kepastian absolut dan diakui benar secara universal, sehingga bisa mencapai kebenaran akhir yang pasti, maka falsafah harus menggunakan metode matematika sebagai idealismenya. Karena bagi Descartes, hanya matematikalah satu-satunya disiplin yang dapat menghasilkan pemikiran yang terbukti dan pasti. Artinya, bila falsafah ingin menemukan hasil atau pemikiran yang pasti, maka harus menjadikan metode matematika sebagai idealismenya.
Menurut Descartes, matematika mungkin melakukan itu lantaran ia mempunyai dua pengoperasian mental. Di mana dengan dua hal itulah, pengetahuan yang sesungguhnya akan bisa diraih.
Pertama, intuisi. Intuisi merupakan pemahaman kita atas prinsip bukti diri. Misalnya persamaan aritmatika bahwa, 2 + 5 = 7. Pembuktian akan kebenaran persamaan ini adalah menggunakan pemikiran atau akal, dirasiokan. Dalam hal ini, matematika mempunyai prinsip-prinsip yang kebenarannya telah diakui dalam akal, yang dipahami bahwa itu benar.
Kedua, deduksi. Deduksi yang dimaksud di sini ialah pemikiran atau kesimpulan logis yang diturunkan dari prinsip bukti diri. Persamaan aritmatika di atas misalnya, dengan persamaan itu kita bisa mendeduksikan, yakni menurunkan kesimpulan-kesimpulan lain yang serupa.
Jadi, intuisi dan deduksi itulah yang ada dalam metode matematika. Ketika sebuah metode pengetahuan (baca: epistemologi) mampu beroperasi seperti metode matematika itu, maka, bagi kalangan rasionalis, pasti akan menghasilkan pengetahuan yang tidak bisa diragukan lagi, pengetahuan yang tetap dan pasti, absolut dan universal.
Bagiamana rasionalis memandang pengalaman? Peneguhan kalangan rasionalis bahwa hanya akal yang menjadi basis dan sumber pengetahuan, bukanlah berarti bahwa kalangan ini menafikan pengalaman secara total-sepenuhnya. Artinya, rasionalisme masih tetap memandang pengalaman sebagai sebuah kualitas yang bernilai, meskipun kadar nilai itu tentunya tidak setinggi akal atau rasio. Bagi kalangan rasionalis, pengalaman dapat menjadi pelengkap bagi akal.
Berkenaan dengan pengalaman tersebut ini, kalangan rasionalis biasanya membedakan antara pendapat dan pengetahuan. Bila pendapat adalah merujuk pada pengalaman, maka pengetahuan adalah yang merujuk pada akal atau pemikiran. Perkataan seseorang bahwa ia telah melihat Monas misalnya, itu adalah sekedar pendapat, dan bukan pengetahuan, sebab sangat dimungkinkan bahwa mata yang digunakan orang itu adalah menipu, artinya masih diragukan. Sementara bila seseorang berkata bahwa 2 + 5 = 7, maka inilah pengetahuan, lantaran perkataan orang terakhir ini merupakan prinsip yang tidak diragukan lagi, aksioma atau prinsip a-priori.
Akhir
Rasionalisme merupakan aliran falsafah yang berpandangan bahwa dasar dan sumber pengetahuan, atau secara umum falsafah, adalah akal atau rasio. Adalah akal, yang bisa dijadikan dasar sekaligus sumber pengetahuan, sehingga berhasil memperoleh pengetahuan yang tetap dan pasti, serta absolut dan universal.
Sebagai sebuah epistemologi, rasionalisme menggunakan aksioma-aksioma, pengertian-pengertian atau prinsip-prinsip umum rasional yang bersifat a-priori, sebagai basis pengetahuan sekaligus sebagai sumber. Apa yang bersesuaian dengan prinsip-prinsip dimaksud ini, dan segala hal yang dapat dideduksikan dari prinsip-prinsip tersebut, itulah pengetahuan bagi kalangan rasionalisme. Sesuatu yang tidak dideduksikan dari prinsip-prinsip a-priori, atau tidak sesuai dengan prinsip-prinsip tersebut, itu bukanlah pengetahuan, ia hanyalah sekedar opini.
Sebagai sebuah epistemologi yang keberpihakannya hanya terhadap akal atau rasio, rasionalisme pada akhirnya memang banyak menuai kritik. Tak lama sepeninggal Rene Descartes sang bapak kontinental rasionalisme, David Hume (1711-1776) misalnya, telah mengkritik bahwa akal hanyalah sekedar budak daripada nafsu, yang tidak bisa tidak mengabdi kepada nafsu, pastinya selalu mengabdi.
Namun demikian, problem dan kritik atas rasionalisme tersebut, tentunya bukan berarti bahwa rasionalisme tidak mempunyai arti atau manfaat sama sekali. Sebaliknya, sebagai sebuah aliran falsafah sekaligus sebuah epistemologi, kiranya rasionalisme telah berjasa banyak bagi sejarah falsafah. Melalui bapak kontinentalnya, rasionalisme telah menjadi pintu utama bagi kelahiran falsafah babak modern, yang pada gilirannya telah berhasil melahirkan berbagai aliran-aliran falsafah lainnya, termasuk aliran yang menentangnya.
Dalam hal polemis tersebut ini, penulis pribadi cenderung sepakat dengan GWF. Hegel bahwa segala sesuatunya merupakan bagian dari proses menjadi sadarnya “Aku Absolut”, tidak terkecuali rasionalisme.
Saturday, February 14, 2009
Influences of a Theory of Media on The Philosophy of Technology
We can now use these considerations about the influence of electronic media as an example to illustrate the insights we can gain by applying a theory of media to the classic view of a philosophy of technology. Concerning the range of the term "technology," I have mentioned two extreme points of view: technological determinism on the one hand, and the theory of the heteronomy of technology on the other hand. According to the first viewpoint, the only possible attitude towards the increasing dematerialization of our Lebenswelt is a kind of tragic heroism, whereas with the second alternative we can annul this development simply by changing social conditions. The answer to this conflict depends on defining the range of technology. For this definition a theory of media can provide some clarification. In particular, a theory of media holds a middle position between the two extreme opposites. Three remarks may be in order.
a) After a medium revolution has happened there is no way back to the earlier situation. We can only talk about a former development level in the light of the breakdown of this development level. An annulment of the outcome of a medium revolution is therefore impossible. This consideration seems to support the viewpoint of technological determinism. But a medium revolution is also an opportunity—I am coming now to the second remark.
b) The ontological shift in the electronic media may sharpen our awareness of theoretical questions which were formerly limited to speculative philosophy. Initial metaphysical questions get a technical foundation. At the very moment in which the distinction between the natural and the artificial seems to become blurred a new awareness of this development could take place. Our task is not to undo this development but just to become aware of it. (This awareness could become extremely important, for example, in gene technology.) But already this awareness is an intervention, an intervention in the sense in which psychologists use the expression.
c) A last remark may be in order. As I have already mentioned, the influence of the use of media on our cognitive structures should not be interpreted as a one-way street. Moreover, changes in the structure of our mind can only be reinforced by using media. It would be better therefore to interpret this change as a gradual shift and not as a total replacement. The answer of a theory of media to the dilemma of technological determinism on the one side and the heteronomy thesis on the other is not an all or nothing question. Neither tragic heroism nor deliberate decisions is the appropriate attitude towards new technological developments. What remains for us to do is to emphasize different things within a cultural revolution—a revolution which we can never watch from the standpoint of a neutral observer and which is always an integral part of our own development.
(by. Karl Leidlmair, University of Innsbruck)
Philosophy of Technology
The current debate about technology and its assessment is dominated by two extreme points of view. On the one hand, some people believe that mankind must restrain the self-propelled dynamics of technological development. These considerations are guided by the apocalyptic nightmare of the possible destruction of mankind (possible causes for such scenarios: the greenhouse effect; nuclear winter; nuclear catastrophe; the effects of genetic technology). Others see technology as a chance for self-realization—a liberating from the constraints placed upon us by our nature. As long as it remains unclear, however, what the actual domain of the word "technology" is, we are not in a position to decide between the peril and the potential, between the Luddite and the technophile.
A brief look at the current discussion about this domain, in systematic order, shows the following spectrum. I distinguish between two different theses about technology; the first one I call the "thesis of autonomy" and the second the "thesis of heteronomy." Each of these theses is further subdivided into two classifications.
1) The thesis of autonomy :
According to this thesis decisions about technological development are based upon constraints which are independent of human interests and desires. This independence can in turn be interpreted in a relative or in an absolute sense.
a) According to the relative independence approach technology establishes a realm of quasi-autonomous decisions; it has a rationality of its own. Technological developments, although triggered by human interests and beliefs, are in respect to their technological decisions something neutral and value-free. This is the instrumentalist view of technology. Seen in this way, technology is just a tool, a rule-governed procedure guided by rational purposes. For technology, interpreted as a problem-solving procedure, human interests are found at the beginning or at the end of a technological development, but not at its core. As a consequence, questions of technology assessment are restricted to the outcome of technological development. We may, for example, decide to use raw material as a source of energy. But the specific technology we apply depends exclusively on facts and information based on technical considerations. Following this view, technology is nothing but a means of solving problems such as the production and processing of raw materials, problems of transportation and so on. As far as human interests are concerned, technological decisions are relatively autonomous. This means that the decisions of the engineer depend on the goals of human interests, but the choice of the means depends only on technical considerations. From the standpoint of humanities and social research, technology in its inner decision logic is just a black box of no further interest for the scientist. Behind this view is the conviction that technology like the natural sciences can be separated from human interests. The engineer and the scientist make their decisions unbiased by external factors. The natural sciences and technology form a realm of logical autonomy. Technology is at the same time independent of natural science because of its more pragmatic goals.
b) According to the second view—total autonomy of technology— technology is not an instrument at all. On the contrary, human beings are completely in the hands of technological productions which develop with law-like necessity. This view is sometimes called technological determinism. But it is not clear what the subject of technological determinism is. The interpretation of the grounds for this necessity depends on particular philosophical positions and I will therefore not go into more detail. Within the scope of this view one finds such different positions as those of Martin Heidegger and Hermann Schmidt.
2) The heteronomy of technology thesis :
Before going into this thesis in detail, I want to sum up the basic ideas behind this position. Generally speaking, the heteronomy thesis says that technical decisions are at their inner core triggered by human interests, desires, and paradigmatic worldviews. In contrast to the instrumentalist approach, technological decisions are not autonomous in regard to the means. The choice of the means depends on non-technical assumptions. Technological decisions are not a black box for humanities and social sciences; they are in themselves an integral part of their research domain.
Technology assessment is therefore not restricted to the outcome of technological development; instead, it has to take into account the direct dependency of the technological decision-making process on human interests and worldviews. These interests and worldviews need not always be manifest. They form the tacit background on which the engineer bases his decisions. Let me give an example. I refer to a study of Kluge and Schramm, Wassernöte: Eine Umwelt- und Sozialgeschichte des Trinkwassers (1986). In this study a controversy is reported about the question whether drinking water resources should be centralized or decentralized. As it turned out, most of the engineers preferred a centralized solution. But the arguments they put forward for their decision were not entirely rational. Their advocacy of a central solution was, on the contrary, grounded in the idea of an undivided, self-contained, and circular watercourse. The motives behind their decision were grounded in ideological assumptions like the uniformity of nature. The open question in the heteronomy thesis of technology is, however, how these human interests and worldviews which inform technological decisions are defined. There are, as far as I can see, two alternatives for this definition.
a) Products of technology are nothing but an objective mirror and materialization of ideas in our head. Technological decisions are based upon the psychological state of people who produce technical artifacts. If we want to criticize products of technology, we have therefore to criticize those inner ideas in the head of the engineer. The human-made technological artifacts are not problematic; the problem is human beings. They are responsible for their products.
b) According to the second alternative of the heteronomy thesis of technology, technological products are not just a mirror of ideas in our head. But neither is there a blind course of technological development which determines our mental state, as technological determinism might assume. Mental states and products of technology are created by a third factor. This third factor comprises the social habits and rituals which shape not only our individual mental states but also the products of technology. The crucial point of this position may be shown by the following example which I call the "Eliza-effect." Weizenbaum's program Eliza allows us to communicate with a computer in a way similar to a natural language. The idea behind this program is to install a psychotherapeutic conversation in a computer. Now as it turned out, Eliza was very successful. But the actual reason for this success was not the intelligence of the computer program, nor was it the stupidity of the people who communicated with the program. The actual reason for the success was the social role in which the psychotherapeutic conversation, especially in accordance with the method of Carl Rogers, takes place. Only if the conversation happens in a quasi-automatic manner can we personally believe that the conversation is a machine-like communication, and only then is the substitution for a natural-language conversation by a computer conversation possible. To put it in a nutshell: the success of Weizenbaum's Eliza is grounded in the machine-like behavior of our social roles, not in the machine.
Now that I have given this classification scheme for the various definitions of the domain of technology, one additional remark may be in order. My two-fold scheme is only a rough sketch of standard views. An account of the actual range of the term "technology," in contrast to these four ideal types, will be a more or less vague mixture of the listed standard views. I am sorry, but I cannot produce more clarity than there is.
What is especially missing is a clear distinction between technology as a science, the process of technological development, and the products of technology. The reason for this vaguessness is that such a clear-cut distinction can be made only after the domain of technology has been defined, and not before. Technological determinism or instrumentalism, just to give an example, may simply stress different aspects of the concept "technology."
A definition of the range of technology is necessary in order to establish the degree of freedom we have to control technological development. Technological determinism and instrumentalism, obviously, give different answers.
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
Freud and Jung: Why We Dream?
Dream Theorists
There is no proven fact on why we dream, which is why there are so many theories on the topic. There is Freud's theory that dreams carry our hidden desires and there is Jung's theory that dreams carry meaning, although not always of desire, and that these dreams can be interpreted by the dreamer. After these theories, others continued such as the Cayce theory in that dreams are our bodies means of building up of the mental, spiritual and physical well-being. Finally came the argument between Evans' theory and the Crick and Mitchinson theory. Evans states that dreaming is our bodies way of storing the vast array of information gained during the day, whereas Crick and Mitchinson say that this information is being dumped rather than stored. Whichever theory is true, we may never know, but from these following theories we can decide for ourselves what we believe to be true and further help us into understanding our dreams.
Freud's Theory
Out of all theories before his, and all of those today, this is the one that stands out the most. He believed that a dream represented an ongoing wish along with the previous days activities. They may even portray wishes that have been inside us since early childhood. In fact, he believed, every dream is partially motivated by a childhood wish. Another interesting idea was that nothing is made up during a dream and that they are biologically determined, derived completely from instinctual needs and personal experiences.
Probably one of the most interesting ideas among these theories is his theory of dream occurrence. Dreams occur in a state of "ego collapse" when the demands of the Id (imperative bodily needs) and Superego (conscience ego ideals) converge upon the Ego (personal desires and mediator between the Id and Superego). In easier terms, a dream will occur when the unconscious wish is bound to the preconscious instead of just being discharged.
Many of Freud's theories still stand true today, but most of all in the area of defense mechanisms our body uses while we dream. If our minds have been dealing with too much denial, regression, or repression, it causes an internal conflict, a dream in this case, to take place. This prevents us from building up intolerable states of psychological tension in waking life. This is why, if you become too emotional, it actually works to "sleep it off."
According to Jung
Jung, disagreeing with Freud's theory, quickly developed his own which contradicted Freud's. Jung believed the most effective method for dream interpretation was the use of series correlation. Freud didn't even believe interpretation was possible by the dreamer and that dreams could only be interpreted by a trained psychologist. Jung was the one who gave hope to all dreamers who were looking for the meaning in our dreams without having to hire a "professional."
Series correlation is a process involving the analysis of dreams over time. Jung suggested taking similar dreams from you dream journal and merging the dream images together forming a larger dream. Try and gather these images into your head, he suggested, and from these images determined if there are any waking situations that might be related. From this information write out a physical action that could be taken based off of the information learned through using this technique.
Like Freud, Jung categorized the mind into three parts: the collective unconscious, the personal unconscious, and the conscious. The collective unconscious consists of imbedded deposits of world processes. It does not depend on personal experience, only the images which are prefigured by evolution. The personal unconscious is a receptacle or storage mechanism for that which is not contained within the consciousness. It holds forgotten association, unnoticed experiences, observations, moral questioning, repressed and discarded thoughts, half-thoughts, seemingly irrelevant details, and incongruities. Finally comes the consciousness, wich develops through sensing, thinking, and intuition.
When Jung interpreted dreams he found that the most important thing to do was ask yourself questions about the images in your dreams and from these questions, write down all of the associations you can think of. Here are the questions he would ask himself:
What is the shape of the image?
What is the function of the image?
What alterations does the image go through?
What does the image do?
What do you like and dislike about the image?
What does the image remind you of?
(http://library.thinkquest.org/)
Dream History: Modern Philosophies
Probably the most well-known of the modern dream philosophers was Sigmund Freud. His theory was that although dreams may be prompted by external stimuli, wish-fulfillment was the root behind most of our dreams. Freud's idea was that our dreams were reflection of our deepest desires going back to our childhood. To Freud, no dream was of entertainment value, they all held important meanings.
Carl Jung, a student of Freud for some time, disagreed on the theory that erotic content was the basis behind most of our dreams. Jung believed that dreams reminded us of our wishes, which enables us to realize the things we unconsciously yearn for, and helps us to fulfill our own wishes. Contradictory to how Freud believed dreams were a product of our desires that were too outrageous for our own belief, and were in our unconscious to help conceal these desires. These dreams were messages, Jung believed, from ourselves to ourselves and that we should pay attention to them for our own benefit.
Today, most psychologists agree with Jung's theory, and it is this theory that makes dream interpretation something that we can use in our everyday lives. If Freud were alive today his would disagree with every theory that says you are able to interpret your own dreams. Jung believed that, although it was difficult, dreams were meant to be understood.
(library.thinkquest.org/)
PHILOSOPHY OF DREAM
One dreams many things that are never to be experienced in this life such as “He dreams he
is flying in the air.”
A dream is not an entirely new experience, because most often it is the memory of past
experiences.
In the waking state the light of the self is mixed up with the functions of the organs, intellect,
mind, external lights etc. In dreams the self becomes distinct and isolated as the organs do not act
and the lights such as the sun that help them are absent.
The dreamer is not affected by whatever result of the good and evil he sees in the dream
state. No one regards himself a sinner on account of the sins committed in dreams. People who have
heard of them do not condemn or shun them. Hence he is not touched by them.
The dreamer only appears to be doing things in dream but actually there is no activity The
Sruti says, “He sees to be enjoying himself in the company of women.” (Bri. Up. IV. iii. 13.) He
who described his dream experiences uses the words ‘as if’; “I saw today as if a herd of elephants
was running.” Therefore the dreaming self has no activity in dreams.
An action is done by the contact of the body and the senses, which have form with
something else that has form. We never see a formless thing being active. The Self is formless.
Therefore it is not attached. As this Self is unattached, it is untouched by what it beholds in dreams.
Hence we cannot ascribe activity to it, as activity proceeds from the contact of the body and the
organs. There is no contact for the Self, because this infinite Self is unattached. Therefore it is
immortal.
Doctors say, “Do not wake him up suddenly or violently”, because they see that in dreams
the self goes out of the body of the waking state through the gates of the organs and remains isolated
outside. If the self is violently aroused it may not find those gates of the organs. If he does not find
the right organ the body becomes difficult to doctor. The self may not get back to those gates of the
organs, things which it sent out taking the shining functions of the latter, or it may misplace those
functions. In that case defects such as blindness and deafness may result. The doctor may find it
difficult to treat them.
Dreams are due to mental impressions (Vasanas) received in the waking state. The
consciousness in a dream depends on the previous knowledge acquired in the wakeful state.
The dreams have the purpose of either cheering or saddening and frightening the sleeper, so
as to requite him for his good and evil deeds. His Adrishta thus furnishes the efficient cause of the
dreams.
Even in the state of dream the instruments of the self are not altogether at rest, because
scripture states that even then it is connected with Buddhi (intellect). “Having become a dream,
together with Buddhi it passes beyond this world.”
Smriti also says, “When the senses being at rest, the mind not being at rest, is occupied with
the objects, know that state to be a dream.”
Scripture says that desires etc. are modifications of the mind (Bri, Up. I-v-3). Desires are
observed in dreams. Therefore, the self wanders about in dreams together with the mind only.
The scripture in describing our doings in dreams qualifies them by an ‘as it were’. “As it
were rejoicing together with women, or laughing as it were, or seeing terrible sights”. Ordinary people also describe the dreams in the same manner. “I ascended as it were the
summit of a mountain, I saw a tree, as it were”.
Dream creation is unreal. Reality implies the factors of time, space and causation. Further,
reality cannot be sublated or stultified. Dream creation has not got these traits.
Dream is called ‘Sandhya’ or the intermediate state because it is midway between waking
and the deep sleep state, between the Jagrat and the Sushupti.
Dreams, though of a strange and illusory nature, are a good index of the high or low spiritual
and moral condition of the dreamer. He, who has a pure heart and untainted character, will never get
impure dreams. An aspirant who is ever meditating will dream of his Sadhana and his object of
meditation. He will do worship of the Lord and recite His name and Mantra even in dream through
the force of Samskara.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Humor, Laughter, Comedy, and the Holy Grail
The majority of the work on humor has been occupied with the foundational question – just what is humor? The word "humor" itself is of relatively recent origin: according to the Oxford English Dictionary, it arose during the 17th century out of psycho-physiological scientific speculation on the effects of various humors that might affect a person's temperament. Much of the earlier humor research is riddled with equivocations between humor and laughter, and the problem continues into recent discussions. John Dewey states one reason to make the distinction: "The laugh is by no means to be viewed from the standpoint of humor; its connection with humor is only secondary. It marks the ending [. . .] of a period of suspense, or expectation, all ending which is sharp and secondary" (John Dewey, 558). We laugh for a variety of reasons – hearing a funny joke, inhaling laughing gas, being tickled – not all of which result from what we think of as humor. Attempting to offer a general theory of laughter and humor, John Morreall makes a finer distinction: laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift, whereas, humor arises from a pleasant cognitive shift. Noting the predominance of non-humorous laughter, researcher Robert Provine argues that laughter is most often found in non-humorous social interactions, deployed as some sort of tension relief mechanism. If humor is not a necessary condition of laughter, then we might ask if it is sufficient. Often humor will produce laughter, but sometimes it results in only a smile. Obviously, these relatively distinct phenomena are intimately connected in some manner, but to understand the relationship we need clearer notions of both laugher and humor.
Laughter is a fairly well described physiological process that results in a limited range of characteristic vocal patterns that are only physiologically possible, as Provine suggests, for bi-pedal creatures with breath control. If we describe humorous laughter as laughter in response to humor, then we must answer the question, What is humor? This topic will be explored in the next few sections, but for starters, we can say that humor or amusement is widely regarded as a response to a certain kind of stimulus. The comic, on the other hand, is best described as a professionally produced source of humor, a generic element of various artforms. In distinguishing between humorous and non-humorous laughter we presuppose a working definition of humor, based partly on the character of our response and partly on the properties of humorous objects. This is not necessarily to beg the question about what is humor, but to enter into the real world process of correctively developing a definition. The first goal of a humor theory is to look for the basis of our practical ability to identify humor.
Most definitions of humor are essentialist in that they try to list the necessary and sufficient conditions something must meet in order to be counted as humor. Some theories isolate a common element supposedly found in all humor, but hold back from making claims about the sufficient conditions. Many theorists seem to confuse offering the necessary conditions for a response to count as humor with explaining why we find one thing funny rather than another. This second question, what would be sufficient for an object to be found funny, is the Holy Grail of humor studies, and must be kept distinct from the goals of a definition of the humor response. The Holy Grail is often confused with a question regarding the sufficient conditions for our response to count as humorous amusement, but a crucial distinction needs to be made: identifying the conditions of a response is different from the isolating the features something must possess in order to provoke such a response. The first task is much different from suggesting what features are sufficient to provoke a response of humorous amusement. What amounts to a humor response is different from what makes something humorous. The noun (humor) and adjectival (humorous) senses of the term are difficult to keep distinct due to the imprecision of our language in this area. Much of the dissatisfaction with traditional humor theories can be traced back to an equivocation between these two senses of the term.
(by: http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humor.htm#H2)
Problems Classifying Theorists
The standard analysis, developed by D. H. Monro, that classifies humor theories into superiority, incongruity, and relief theories sets up a false expectation of genuine competition between the views. Rarely do any of the historical theorists in any of these schools state their theories as listing necessary of sufficient conditions for something to count as humor, much less put their views in competition with others. A further problem concerns just what the something is that might be called humor. Some theories address the object of humor, whereas others are concerned primarily with the characteristics of the response, and other theories discuss both.
The popular reduction of humor theories into three groups -- Incongruity, Relief, and Superiority theories -- is an over simplification. Several scholars have identified over 100 types of humor theories, and Patricia Keith-Spiegel's classification of humor theories into 8 major types (biological, superiority, incongruity, surprise, ambivalence, release, configuration, and psychoanalytic theories) has been fairly influential. Jim Lyttle suggests that, based on the question they are primarily addressing humor, theories can be classified into 3 different groups. He argues that, depending on their focus, humor theories can be grouped under these categories: functional, stimuli, and response theories. (1) Functional theories of humor ask what purpose humor has in human life. (2) Stimuli theories ask what makes a particular thing funny. (3) Response theorists ask why we find things funny. A better way to phrase this concern is to say that response theorists ask what is particular about feelings of humor.
A little probing shows that Lyttle's grouping is strained, since many of the humor theories address more than one of these questions, and an answer to one often involves an answer to the other questions. For instance, though focused on the function of humor, relief theories often have something to say about all three questions: humor serves as a tension release mechanism, the content often concerns the subject of repressed desires, and finding these funny involves a feeling of relief.
Regardless of the classificatory scheme, when analyzing the tradition of humor theories we need to consider how each of the traditionally defined schools answers the major questions that occupy the bulk of the discussion. The primary questions of humor theory include:
1. Humor question: What is humor?
An answer to this question often entails answers to questions regarding the object and the response. This is the central question of any humor theory.
2. Object Feature Questions:
a) Are there any features frequently found in what is found funny?
b) Are there any features necessary for something to have in order to be found funny?
c) Are there any features that by themselves or considered jointly are sufficient for something to be found funny? Answering this question affirmatively would amount to discovering the holy grail of humor theory.
3. Response Question: Is there anything psychologically or cognitively distinctive or characteristic about finding something funny?
4. Laughter question: How is humor related to laughter?
Given this list, we may ask what would a theory of humor amount to? To count as a humor theory and not just an approach to humor, a theory must attempt an answer to question 1 – What is humor? Like the relief theories, most humor theorists do not attempt to answer this question head on, but discuss some important or necessary characteristics of humor. Since the various theories of humor are addressing different sets of questions within this cluster as well as related question in the general study of humor, it is often difficult to put them in competition with each other. Accepting this limitation, we can proceed to explore a few of the major humor theories listed in the widely influential standard analysis.
(by: http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humor.htm#H2)
Summary of Humor Theories
We discussed four different schools of humor theories, and noted how each reveals aspects common, if not necessary, to humor. Presenting these theories as rivals is misleading since, as we have seen, theorists in each classification focus on different problems and may draw upon the answers to different questions from another school. For instance, while focusing on why we find something funny, Spencer offers a functional explanation and relies on the answer incongruity theorists give to the question of what we find funny. Relief theories and Play theories tend to focus on the function humor serves in human life, though the functional question cannot be separated from characterizing amusement, or the humor response. Superiority theorists tend to focus on what feelings are necessary for there to be humor, or why we find some things funny. Incongruity theories have the most to say about the object of humor, though variants identify humor with the way we respond to a perceived incongruity. Though the functional, stimuli, and response questions are not neatly separated, the differing schools tend to assume that one question is more basic than the others.
(by: http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humor.htm#H2)
Theories of Humor: Play Theories
Describing play theories of humor as an independent school or approach might overstate their relative importance, although they do serve as a good representative of theories focused on the functional question. By looking at the contextual characteristic, play theories try to classify humor as a species of play. In this general categorization effort, the play theorists are not so much listing necessary conditions, as they are asking us to look at humor as an extension of animal play. They try to call our attention to the structural similarities between play contexts and humorous context, to suggest that what might be true of play, might be true of humor as well.
Play theorists often take an ethological approach to studying humor, tracing it back through evolutionary development. They look at laughter triggers like tickling, that are found in other species, to suggest that in humor ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. In The Enjoyment of Laughter, Max Eastman develops a play theory of humor with an adaptive story. He thinks we can find analogies of humor in the behavior of animals, especially in the proto-laughter of chimps to tickling. He goes so far as to argue that the wagging tail of a happy dog is a form of humorous laughter, since Eastman wants to broaden the definition of laughter to encompass other rhythmic responses to pleasure. Speaking more specifically of humor, he argues that "we come into the world endowed with an instinctive tendency to laugh and have this feeling in response to pains presented playfully" (Eastman, 45). On Eastman's account, what is central to humor and play is that both require taking a disinterested attitude towards what might otherwise be seen as serious.
Eastman considers humor to be a form of play, because humor involves a disinterested stance, certain kinds of humor involve mock aggression and insults, and because some forms of play activities result in humorous amusement. Since Eastman defines play as the adoption of this disinterested attitude, humor would count as a form of play on his definition, but this seems both too restrictive and too vague to serve as an adequate definition of play. In Homo Ludens, John Huizinga criticizes identifying play with laughter or the comic. Though both seem to involve "the opposite of seriousness," there are crucial asymmetries. Laughter, he argues, is particular to humans, whereas, play is found in other mammals and birds. Also, if we allow for certain types of competitive play, then a non-serious attitude is not essential to play, as it seems to be for humor. Identifying the comic, or humor, with play is problematic, since "in itself play is not comical for either for the player or public" (Homo Ludens, 6). Huizinga questions whether humor and play share any necessary conditions, a requirement of the relationship if humor is a subtype of play. This will, of course, depend on how we describe humor and play, two equally elusive notions.
Play theorists are primarily concerned with the problem of determining the function of humor in order to explain how it might have adaptive value, a task taken up by other biological theories of humor. They argue that similarities between play and humor suggest that the adaptive value of play might be similar to that of humor. Other researchers focused on the functional questions have described humor as having value in cognitive development, social skill learning, tension relief, empathy management, immune system benefits, stress relief, and social bonding. Though these questions are primarily addressed by psychologists, sociologist, anthropologists, and medical researchers, their studies rely on and contribute to an evolving notion of just what counts as humor. Though the functional question is foremost in these theories, play theory tries to give humor a genus by offering some differentiating characteristics, essential to humor.
(by: www.iep.utm.edu/h/humor.htm#H2)
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