Pemikiran Hegel yang tertuang dalam karyanya Philosophy of Right merupakan pintu masuk ke dalam pemikirannya tentang filsafat politik. Di dalamnya Hegel membahas tema-tema pemikiran politiknya yang meliputi permasalahan tentang hukum, moralitas dan kesusilaan. Di dalam tema kesusilaan, ia membahas pula dialektika yang terjadi di dlaam keluarga, masyarakat dan negara. Berkaitan dengan ini, salah satu yang menjadi pokok pembicaraannya dalam hukum abstrak adalah konsepnya tentang hak milik atau kepemilikan. Bagaimana kepemilikan itu berkaitan dengan kehendak, kebebasan dan hukum yang merupakan persoalan yang tidak bisa lepas dari pemikirannya. Justifikasi kepemilikan ini ternyata juga berhubungan dengan konsep tentang person dan kepribadian. Tulisan berikut ini akan memaparkan justifikasi Hegel terhadap kepemilikan itu.
Kerangka utama sistem filsafat Hegel
Kerangka filsafat Hegel dikategorikan ke
dalam tiga bagian berikut ini. Pertama yakni filsafat logika, kedua yakni filsafat alam dan filsafat roh. Ketiganya merupakan momen-momen dalam keseluruhan proses perjalanan roh/ide/kehendak menuju pada kepenuhan dan kesadarannya yang absolut. Untuk mencapai pada kesadaran diri yang sepenuhnya, roh tersebut niscaya perlu mengejawantahkan dirinya secara dialektis dalam berbagai realitas material. Tema filsafat politik merupakan momen dalam tahap perkembangan filsafat roh, tepatnya dalam tahap perkembangan roh objektif. Perkembangan roh objetktif ini terjadi dalam tiga tahap pula yakni hukum abstrak, moralitas dan kesusilaan. Roh/ide/kehendak yang berkembang itu akan mencapai kepenuhannya dalam tahap kesusilaan, yang mana di dalam tahap ini, roh akan melalui tiga fase perkembangan yakni keluarga, masyarakat sipil dan negara. Dalam negara inilah rasionalitas dan kebebasan inidividu menjadi mungkin dan tercapai; dalam negara pula, kebebasan individu menyatu dengan totalitas kebebasan yang absolut.
Hal yang tidak terpisahkan dari penjelasan dan uraian Hegel tentang kepemilikan tidak terlepas dari konsepnya tentang kehendak bebas. Hampir seluruh filsafatnya bertitik tolak atau berdasarkan paham kebebasan ini. Dari sinilah ia merumuskan filsafatnya sebagai sejarah ynag berkembang ke arah kemerdekaan. Hal ini bagi Hegel tampak dalam tradisi Kristiani yang terjadi dalam komunitas jemaat perdana. Di dalam komunitas ini, paham subjektifitas itu sangat diperhatikan dan dijunjung tinggi. Manusia, dalam konsep ini dipandang sebagai persona yang bebas. Paham manusia yang bebas ini pula berkembang dan kemudian diteruskan dalam kenyataan sosial. Kenyataan tersebut bagi Hegel ditemukan dan tampak dalam revolusi Perancis yang dibawa oleh Napoleon Bonaparte.
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Modern Philosophy | Konsep dan Relasi antara Kebebasan, Person dan Kepemilikan Menurut Hegel (1)
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Religion based on Logic
Religion and Logic have been considered to be mutually exclusive. Logic being reality and science and religion being the world of make believe. Many people from the world of logic look at religion as a form of mental defect that undermines the principles of science. However pure Atheism doesn't tell us what right and wrong is or how we should live our lives as humans exploring reality. The Atheist community is aware of the fact that it doesn't fill this void. Religion provides more than just a fictional doctrine. It provides a community. It provides a moral compass to determine what is right and what is wrong. It's a blueprint of how to live our lives.
In modern times the scientific and atheistic communities have made some progress towards addressing the human side of Atheism. Humanism is a good start towards addressing these issues. Atheists who want to eliminate churches and religion often realize that they will never succeed until they have a working substitute that fulfills the legitimate functions of religions to form community, to care for one another, to create a basis for right and wrong, to perform weddings and funerals, to provide spiritual counseling, and to provide a sense of belonging. Fiction based religions provide these services and often do so in a very flawed way. But fiction based religion is the only source of this type of community, until now.Most people say that it can never be done, the task of creating a religion based on reality that supports logic and reason as its standards for creating the guidelines for humanity to live by. But I say that it can be done, and it must be done. As a scientist I can not accept the premise that a fictional based worldview is required to perform the legitimate and necessary functions of a church. Therefore there must be a model for a religion that functions as a church but is based on reality. If we assume that such a model can exist then it becomes a puzzle to be solved. How do we do that? How do we create a religion based on reality? How do we unite the two?
That is one of our missions. We are the Church of Reality and we have to live up to our name bringing the Church and Reality together. And we have to do it in a way that stays true to the standards and requirements of both worlds. On the Reality side the Church of Reality must be scientifically pure. We can not compromise science for example by accepting a deity just because it's popular. On the Church side we have to create a sense of right and wrong, provide guidance on how people should live their lives. We have to create a moral code, a community, and address the spiritual needs of the community without having to resort to spirits to do so. The Church of Reality is primarily a church which is based on reality. We are a religion first. We are about people and the human experience. We are people exploring reality as it really is.
By taking the name Church of Reality we have accepted as an axiom that the problem is solvable and that it is our dharma to solve the problem.
Filsafat Rasionalisme: Logika Menentang Agama
Filsafat Rasionalisme satu aliran filsafat modern, yaitu empirisme. Kali ini saya akan menggali lebih dalam tentang aliran kontra empirisme, taitu Rasionalisme. Rasionalisme sangat bertentangan dengan empirisme. Rasionalisme mengatakan bahwa pengenalan yang sangat sejati berasal dari rasio, sehingga pengenalan inderawi merupakan suatu bentuk pengenalan yang kabur. Lebih detail, Rasionalisme adalah merupakan faham atau aliran yang berdasarkan rasio, ide-ide yang masuk akal. Selain itu tidak ada sumber kebenaran yang hakiki.
Zaman Rasionalisme berlangsung dari pertengahan abad ke XVII sampai akhir abad ke XVIII. Pada zaman ini hal yang khas bagi ilmu pengetahuan adalah penggunaan yang eksklusif daya akal budi (ratio) untuk menemukan kebenaran. Ternyata, penggunaan akal budi yang demikian tidak sia-sia, melihat tambahan ilmu pengetahuan yang besar sekali akibat perkembangan yang pesat dari ilmu-ilmu alam. Maka tidak mengherankan bahwa pada abad-abad berikut orang-orang yang terpelajar Makin percaya pada akal budi mereka sebagai sumber kebenaran tentang hidup dan dunia. Hal ini menjadi menampak lagi pada bagian kedua abad ke XVII dan lebih lagi selama abad XVIII antara lain karena pandangan baru terhadap dunia yang diberikan oleh Isaac Newton (1643 -1727). Berkat sarjana geniaal Fisika Inggris ini yaitu menurutnya Fisika itu terdiri dari bagian-bagian kevil (atom) yang berhubungan satu sama lain menurut hukum sebab akibat. Semua gejala alam harus diterangkan menurut jalan mekanis ini. Harus diakui bahwa Newton sendiri memiliki suatu keinsyafan yang mendalam tentang batas akal budi dalam mengejar kebenaran melalui ilmu pengetahuan. Berdasarkan kepercayaan yang makin kuat akan kekuasaan akal budi lama kelamaan orang-orang abad itu berpandangan dalam kegelapan. Baru dalam abad mereka menaikkan obor terang yang menciptakan manusia dan masyarakat modern yang telah dirindukan, karena kepercayaan itu pada abad XVIII disebut juga zaman Aufklarung (pencerahan).
Tokoh-tokohnya
1. Rene Descartes (1596 -1650)
2. Nicholas Malerbranche (1638 -1775)
3. B. De Spinoza (1632 -1677 M)
4. G.W.Leibniz (1946-1716)
5. Christian Wolff (1679 -1754)
6. Blaise Pascal (1623 -1662 M)
MENGKAJI FENOMENA KESEHARIAN
Dari sedut pandang pemikiran filsafat Rasinalisme tersebut, sekiranya saya dapat mengambil contoh tentang logika di dalam agama. Dari salam satu tulisan yang saya temukan di internet,
“Ada sebuah ungkapan, terkenal dari tokoh besar di dunia Islam, Ibn Taimiyyah, yang arti harfiahnya “Barang siapa menggunakan logika maka ia telah kafir”.” demikian ungkapan tersebut. Apakah sikap seperti ini dapat dibenarkan? Ataukah memang mutlak salah?
Apa implikasi jika sikap seperti ini dibenarkan?
Dan apa pula konsekuensinya jika ia mutlak salah?
Ataukah sikap seperti ini relatif, bisa benar sekaligus bisa salah secara bersamaan?
Dan apa-kah konsekuensinya jika kebenaran sikap seperti ini relatif?
Seperti kita ketahui bahwa Logika adalah kaidah-kaidah berfikir. Subyeknya akal-akal rasional. Obyeknya adalah proposisi bahasa. Proposisi bahasa yang mencerminkan realitas, apakah itu realitas di alam nyata ataupun realitas di alam fikiran. Kaidah-kaidah berfikir dalam logika bersifat niscaya atau mesti. Penolakan terhadap kaidah berfikir ini adalah mustahil (tidak mungkin). Bahkan mustahil pula dalam semua khayalan atau “angan-angan” yang mungkin (all possible intelligebles).
Contohnya, sesuatu apapun pasti sama dengan dirinya sendiri, dan tidak sama dengan yang bukan dirinya. Prinsip berfikir ini telah tertanam secara niscaya sejak manusia lahir. Tertanam secara kodrati dan spontan. Dan selalu hadir kapan saja fikiran digunakan. Dan ini harus selalu diterima kapan saja realitas apapun dipahami. Bahkan, lebih jauh, prinsip ini sesungguhnya adalah satu dari watak niscaya seluruh yang maujud (the very property of being). Tidak mengakui prinsip ini, yang biasa disebut dengan prinsip non-kontradiksi, akan menghancurkan seluruh kebenaran dalam alam bahasa maupun dalam semua alam lain. Tidak menerimanya berarti meruntuhkan seluruh arsitektur bangunan agama, filsafat, sains dan teknologi, dan seluruh pengetahuan manusia.
Maka sebagai contoh ungkapan dari ‘Ibn Taimiyyah’ di atas, jika misal pernyataan itu benar, maka menggunakan kaidah logika adalah salah. Karena menggunakan kaidah logika salah, maka prinsip non-kontradiksi salah. Kalau prinsip non-kontradiksi salah. Artinya seluruh kebenaran tiada bermakna, tidak bisa dibenarkan ataupun disalahkan, atau bisa dibenarkan dan disalahkan sekaligus.
Kalau seluruh keberadaan tidak bermakna, maka pernyataan itu sendiri “Barang siapa menggunakan logika maka ia telah kafir” juga naif. Tak bermakna. Tak juga perlu dipikirkan. Menerima kebenaran pernyataan beliau tersebut sama saja dengan mengkafirkan beliau. Karena jika pernyataan tersebut benar, maka untuk membenarkannya telah digunakan kaidah logika. Dan karena beliau telah menggunakan kaidah logika, menurut pernyataan-nya sendiri beliau kafir.
Jadi sebaiknya pernyataan pengkafiran orang yang menggunakan logika ini benar-benar ditolak. Pernyataan ini salah. Dan sangat Salah. Dan mustahil benar. Karena kalau benar, semua orang yang berfikir benar kafir. Dan ini mustahil.
Dilihat dari segi pandangan umum, Islam jelas menentang adanya relativisme Kebenaran. Dalam Islam yang benar pasti benar dan tidak mungkin salah. Sedang yang salah pasti salah dan tak mungkin benar.
Penerapan kaidah-kaidah berfikir yang benar telah menghantarkan para filosof (pecinta kebijaksanaan) besar pada keyakinan yang pasti akan keberadaan Tuhan.
Jelas-jelas penerapan logika bagi mereka tidak menentang agama. Malah sebaliknya, me-real-kan agama sampai ke seluruh pori-pori rohaninya yang mungkin. Atau dengan kata lain, mencapai hakikat.
Dalam dialog terakhir Socrates, digambarkan betapa figur filsuf ini mati tersenyum setelah menyebut nama Tuhan sebelum akhir hayatnya Alih-alih logika menentang agama, malah logika adalah kendaraan “super-executive” untuk mencapai hakikat kebenaran spiritual. Dan sekali lagi alih-alih logika menentang agama, tanpa logika agama tak-kan dapat terpahami.
Jadi apakah Logika dalam Agama = kebenaran spiritual ?!
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Filosofi Cinta
Cinta bisa jadi merupakan kata yang paling banyak dibicarakan manusia. Setiap orang memiliki rasa cinta yang bisa diaplikasikan pada banyak hal. Wanita, harta, anak, kendaraan, rumah dan berbagai kenikmatan dunia lainnya merupakan sasaran utama cinta dari kebanyakan manusia. Cinta yang paling tinggi dan mulia adalah cinta seorang hamba kepada Rabb-nya.
Kita sering mendengar kata yang terdiri dari lima huruf: CINTA. Setiap orang bahkan telah merasakannya, namun sulit untuk mendefinisikannya. Terlebih untuk mengetahui hakikatnya. Berdasarkan hal itu, seseorang dengan gampang bisa keluar dari jeratan hukum syariat ketika bendera cinta diangkat. Seorang pezina dengan gampang tanpa diiringi rasa malu mengatakan, “Kami sama-sama cinta, suka sama suka.” Karena alasan cinta, seorang bapak membiarkan anak-anaknya bergelimang dalam dosa. Dengan alasan cinta pula, seorang suami melepas istrinya hidup bebas tanpa ada ikatan dan tanpa rasa cemburu sedikitpun.
Demikianlah bila kebodohan telah melanda kehidupan dan kebenaran tidak lagi menjadi tolok ukur. Dalam keadaan seperti ini, setan tampil mengibarkan benderanya dan menabuh genderang penyesatan dengan mengangkat cinta sebagai landasan bagi pembolehan terhadap segala yang dilarang Allah dan Rasul-Nya Muhammad . Allah berfirman:
“Dijadikan indah pada (pandangan) manusia kecintaan kepada apa-apa yang diingini yaitu: wanita-wanita, anak-anak, harta yang banyak dari jenis emas, perak, kuda pilihan, binatang-binatang ternak dan sawah ladang. Itulah kesenangan hidup di dunia dan di sisi Allah-lah tempat kembali yang baik.” (Ali ‘Imran: 14)
Rasulullah dalam haditsnya dari shahabat Tsauban mengatakan: ‘Hampir-hampir orang-orang kafir mengerumuni kalian sebagaimana berkerumunnya di atas sebuah tempayan.’ Seseorang berkata: ‘Wahai Rasulullah, apakah jumlah kita saat itu sangat sedikit?’ Rasulullah berkata: ‘Bahkan kalian saat itu banyak akan tetapi kalian bagaikan buih di atas air. Dan Allah benar-benar akan mencabut rasa ketakutan dari hati musuh kalian dan benar-benar Allah akan campakkan ke dalam hati kalian (penyakit) al-wahn.’ Seseorang bertanya: ‘Apakah yang dimaksud dengan al-wahn wahai Rasulullah?’ Rasulullah menjawab: ‘Cinta dunia dan takut mati.’ (HR. Abu Dawud no. 4297, dan dishahihkan oleh Asy-Syaikh Al-Albani dalam Shahih Sunan Abi Dawud no. 3610)
Asy-Syaikh ‘Abdurrahman As-Sa’di dalam tafsirnya mengatakan: “Allah memberitakan dalam dua ayat ini (Ali ‘Imran: 13-14) tentang keadaan manusia kaitannya dengan masalah lebih mencintai kehidupan dunia daripada akhirat, dan Allah menjelaskan perbedaan yang besar antara dua negeri tersebut. Allah memberitakan bahwa hal-hal tersebut (syahwat, wanita, anak-anak, dsb) dihiaskan kepada manusia sehingga membelalakkan pandangan mereka dan menancapkannya di dalam hati-hati mereka, semuanya berakhir kepada segala bentuk kelezatan jiwa. Sebagian besar condong kepada perhiasan dunia tersebut dan menjadikannya sebagai tujuan terbesar dari cita-cita, cinta dan ilmu mereka. Padahal semua itu adalah perhiasan yang sedikit dan akan hilang dalam waktu yang sangat cepat.”
Definisi Cinta
Untuk mendefinisikan cinta sangatlah sulit, karena tidak bisa dijangkau dengan kalimat dan sulit diraba dengan kata-kata. Ibnul Qayyim mengatakan: “Cinta tidak bisa didefinisikan dengan jelas, bahkan bila didefinisikan tidak menghasilkan (sesuatu) melainkan menambah kabur dan tidak jelas, (berarti) definisinya adalah adanya cinta itu sendiri.” (Madarijus Salikin, 3/9)
Hakikat Cinta
Cinta adalah sebuah amalan hati yang akan terwujud dalam (amalan) lahiriah. Apabila cinta tersebut sesuai dengan apa yang diridhai Allah, maka ia akan menjadi ibadah. Dan sebaliknya, jika tidak sesuai dengan ridha-Nya maka akan menjadi perbuatan maksiat. Berarti jelas bahwa cinta adalah ibadah hati yang bila keliru menempatkannya akan menjatuhkan kita ke dalam sesuatu yang dimurkai Allah yaitu kesyirikan.
Cinta kepada Allah
Cinta yang dibangun karena Allah akan menghasilkan kebaikan yang sangat banyak dan berharga. Ibnul Qayyim dalam Madarijus Salikin (3/22) berkata: ”Sebagian salaf mengatakan bahwa suatu kaum telah mengaku cinta kepada Allah lalu Allah menurunkan ayat ujian kepada mereka:
“Katakanlah: jika kalian cinta kepada Allah maka ikutilah aku, niscaya Allah akan mencintai kalian.” (Ali ‘Imran: 31)
Mereka (sebagian salaf) berkata: “(firman Allah) ‘Niscaya Allah akan mencintai kalian’, ini adalah isyarat tentang bukti kecintaan tersebut dan buah serta faidahnya. Bukti dan tanda (cinta kepada Allah) adalah mengikuti Rasulullah , faidah dan buahnya adalah kecintaan Allah kepada kalian. Jika kalian tidak mengikuti Rasulullah maka kecintaan Allah kepada kalian tidak akan terwujud dan akan hilang.”
Bila demikian keadaannya, maka mendasarkan cinta kepada orang lain karena-Nya tentu akan mendapatkan kemuliaan dan nilai di sisi Allah. Rasulullah bersabda dalam hadits yang diriwayatkan dari Anas bin Malik :
“Tiga hal yang barangsiapa ketiganya ada pada dirinya, niscaya dia akan mendapatkan manisnya iman. Hendaklah Allah dan Rasul-Nya lebih ia cintai daripada selain keduanya, dan hendaklah dia mencintai seseorang dan tidaklah dia mencintainya melainkan karena Allah, dan hendaklah dia benci untuk kembali kepada kekufuran setelah Allah selamatkan dia dari kekufuran itu sebagaimana dia benci untuk dilemparkan ke dalam neraka.” (HR. Al-Bukhari no. 16 dan Muslim no. 43)
Ibnul Qayyim mengatakan bahwa di antara sebab-sebab adanya cinta (kepada Allah) ada sepuluh perkara:
Pertama, membaca Al Qur’an, menggali, dan memahami makna-maknanya serta apa yang dimaukannya.
Kedua, mendekatkan diri kepada Allah dengan amalan-amalan sunnah setelah amalan wajib.
Ketiga, terus-menerus berdzikir dalam setiap keadaan.
Keempat, mengutamakan kecintaan Allah di atas kecintaanmu ketika bergejolaknya nafsu.
Kelima, hati yang selalu menggali nama-nama dan sifat-sifat Allah, menyaksikan dan mengetahuinya.
Keenam, menyaksikan kebaikan-kebaikan Allah dan segala nikmat-Nya.
Ketujuh, tunduknya hati di hadapan Allah .
Kedelapan, berkhalwat (menyendiri dalam bermunajat) bersama-Nya ketika Allah turun (ke langit dunia).
Kesembilan, duduk bersama orang-orang yang memiliki sifat cinta dan jujur.
Kesepuluh, menjauhkan segala sebab-sebab yang akan menghalangi hati dari Allah . (Madarijus Salikin, 3/18, dengan ringkas)
Cinta adalah Ibadah
Sebagaimana telah lewat, cinta merupakan salah satu dari ibadah hati yang memiliki kedudukan tinggi dalam agama sebagaimana ibadah-ibadah yang lain. Allah berfirman:
“Tetapi Allah menjadikan kamu cinta kepada keimanan dan menjadikan iman itu indah dalam hatimu.” (Al-Hujurat: 7)
“Dan orang-orang yang beriman lebih cinta kepada Allah.” (Al-Baqarah: 165)
“Maka Allah akan mendatangkan suatu kaum yang Allah mencintai mereka dan merekapun mencintai-Nya.” (Al-Maidah: 54)
Adapun dalil dari hadits Rasulullah adalah hadits Anas yang telah disebut di atas yang dikeluarkan oleh Al-Imam Al-Bukhari dan Al-Imam Muslim: “Hendaklah Allah dan Rasul-Nya lebih dia cintai daripada selain keduanya.”
Macam-macam cinta
Di antara para ulama ada yang membagi cinta menjadi dua bagian dan ada yang membaginya menjadi empat. Asy-Syaikh Muhammad bin ‘Abdulwahhab Al-Yamani dalam kitab Al-Qaulul Mufid fi Adillatit Tauhid (hal. 114) menyatakan bahwa cinta ada empat macam:
Pertama, cinta ibadah.
Yaitu mencintai Allah dan apa-apa yang dicintai-Nya, dengan dalil ayat dan hadits di atas.
Kedua, cinta syirik.
Yaitu mencintai Allah dan juga selain-Nya. Allah berfirman:
“Dan di antara manusia ada yang menjadikan selain Allah sebagai tandingan-tandingan (bagi Allah), mereka mencintai tandingan-tandingan tersebut seperti cinta mereka kepada Allah.” (Al-Baqarah: 165)
Ketiga, cinta maksiat.
Yaitu cinta yang akan menyebabkan seseorang melaksanakan apa yang diharamkan Allah dan meninggalkan apa-apa yang diperintahkan-Nya. Allah berfirman:
“Dan kalian mencintai harta benda dengan kecintaan yang sangat.” (Al-Fajr: 20)
Keempat, cinta tabiat.
Seperti cinta kepada anak, keluarga, diri, harta dan perkara lain yang dibolehkan. Namun tetap cinta ini sebatas cinta tabiat. Allah berfirman:
“Ketika mereka (saudara-saudara Yusuf ‘alaihis salam) berkata: ‘Yusuf dan adiknya lebih dicintai oleh bapak kita daripada kita.” (Yusuf: 8)
Jika cinta tabiat ini menyebabkan kita tersibukkan dan lalai dari ketaatan kepada Allah sehingga meninggalkan kewajiban-kewajiban, maka berubahlah menjadi cinta maksiat. Bila cinta tabiat ini menyebabkan kita lebih cinta kepada benda-benda tersebut sehingga sama seperti cinta kita kepada Allah atau bahkan lebih, maka cinta tabiat ini berubah menjadi cinta syirik.
Buah cinta
Syaikhul Islam Ibnu Taimiyyah mengatakan: “Ketahuilah bahwa yang menggerakkan hati menuju Allah ada tiga perkara: cinta, takut, dan harapan. Dan yang paling kuat adalah cinta, dan cinta itu sendiri merupakan tujuan karena akan didapatkan di dunia dan di akhirat.” (Majmu’ Fatawa, 1/95)
Asy-Syaikh ‘Abdurrahman As-Sa’di menyatakan: “Dasar tauhid dan ruhnya adalah keikhlasan dalam mewujudkan cinta kepada Allah. Cinta merupakan landasan penyembahan dan peribadatan kepada-Nya, bahkan cinta itu merupakan hakikat ibadah. Tidak akan sempurna tauhid kecuali bila kecintaan seorang hamba kepada Rabbnya juga sempurna.” (Al-Qaulus Sadid, hal. 110)
Bila kita ditanya bagaimana hukumnya cinta kepada selain Allah? Maka kita tidak boleh mengatakan haram dengan spontan atau mengatakan boleh secara global, akan tetapi jawabannya perlu dirinci.
Pertama, bila dia mencintai selain Allah lebih besar atau sama dengan cintanya kepada Allah maka ini adalah cinta syirik, hukumnya jelas haram.
Kedua, bila dengan cinta kepada selain Allah menyebabkan kita terjatuh dalam maksiat maka cinta ini adalah cinta maksiat, hukumnya haram.
Ketiga, bila merupakan cinta tabiat maka yang seperti ini diperbolehkan.
Friday, December 4, 2009
Logika Menentang Agama
“Man tamanthaqa faqad fazandaqa”, demikian ungkapan terkenal dari tokoh besar di dunia Islam, Ibn Taimiyyah. Arti harfiahnya kira-kira adalah, “Barang siapa menggunakan logika maka ia telah kafir”. Apakah sikap seperti ini dapat dibenarkan? Ataukah memang mutlak salah? Apa implikasi jika sikap seperti ini dibenarkan? Dan apa pula konsekuensinya jika ia mutlak salah? Ataukah sikap seperti ini relatif, bisa benar sekaligus bisa salah secara bersamaan atau secara fuzzy ? Dan apa-kah konsekuensinya jika kebenaran sikap seperti ini fuzzy atau relatif?
Logika adalah kaidah-kaidah berfikir. Subyeknya akal-akal rasional. Obyeknya adalah proposisi bahasa. Proposisi bahasa mencerminkan realitas, apakah itu realitas di alam nyata ataupun realitas di alam fikiran. Kaidah-kaidah berfikir dalam logika bersifat niscaya atau mesti. Penolakan terhadap kaidah berfikir ini mustahil (tidak mungkin). Bahkan mustahil pula dalam semua khayalan yang mi\ungkin (all possible intelligebles). Contohnya, sesuatu apapun pasti sama dengan dirinya sendiri, dan tidak sama dengan yang bukan dirinya. Prinsip berfikir ini telah tertanam secara niscaya sejak manusia lahir. Tertanam secara spontan. Dan selalu hadir kapan saja fikiran digunakan. Dan harus selalu diterima kapan saja realitas apapun dipahami. Bahkan, lebih jauh, prinsip ini sesungguhnya adalah satu dari watak niscaya seluruh yang maujud (the very property of being). Tidak mengakui prinsip ini, yang biasa disebut dengan prinsip non-kontradiksi, akan menghancurkan seluruh kebenaran dalam alam bahasa maupun dalam semua alam lain. Tidak menerimanya berarti meruntuhkan seluruh bagunan agama, filsafat, sains dan teknologi, dan seluruh pengetahuan manusia.Sebagai contoh perkataan ‘Ibn Taimiyyah di atas, jika misal pernyataan itu benar, maka menggunakan kaidah logika adalah salah. Karena menggunakan kaidah logika salah, maka prinsip non-kontradiksi salah. Kalau prinsip non-kontradiksi salah . Artinya seluruh kebenaran tiada bermakna, tidak bisa dibenarkan ataupun disalahkan, atau bisa dibenarkan dan disalahkan sekaligus. Kalalu seluruh keberadaan tidak bermakna, maka pernyataan itu sendiri “Man tamanthaqa faqad fazandaqa” juga nafi. Tak bermakna. Tak perlu dipikirkan.
Menerima kebenaran pernyataan beliau tersebut sama saja dengan mengkafirkan beliau. Karena jika peenyataan tersebut benar, maka untuk membenarkannya telah digunakan kaidah logika. Dan karena beliau telah menggunakan kaidah logika, menurut pernyataan-nya sendiri beliau kafir. Jadi sebaiknya pernyataan pengkafiran orang yang menggunakan logika ini benar-benar ditolak. Pernyataan ini salah. Salah. Dan mustahil benar. Karena kalau benar, semua orang yang berfikir benar kafir. Dan ini mustahil.
“Wa qul jaa ‘al-haqqa wazahaaqal-baathil, innal-baathila kaana zahuuqa.” Dalam pandangan saya, Islam jelas menentang adanya relativisme Kebenaran. Dalam Islam yang benar pasti benar dan tidak mungkin salah. Sedang yang salah pasti salah dan tak mungkin benar. Dalam dunia dikenali adanya golongan relativis kebenaran yang disebut sufastaiyyah. Golongan relativis kebenaran ini merupakan pewaris mazhab pemikiran sophisme, yang bermula pada abad ke-5 dan ke-4 SM di Yunani melalui pemikiran Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Giorgias dan lain-lain. Beberapa pemikiran yang mendasari gelombang filsafat pasca-modernis juga merupakan cerminan dari pandangan golongan ini. Dalam majalah Ummat No.3/Thn.I/7 Agustus 1995, hal 76, DR.Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud menjelaskan bahwa Akidah Islam jelas menentang keras sikap golongan sufastaiyyah ini. Bagi golongan sufastaiyyah, benar itu bisa salah dan salah itu bisa benar. Bagi golongan shopisme Yunsni, semua yang jelas-jelas ada ini dianggap tidak memiliki keberadaan. Jadi ada dan tiada sama saja. Bagi golongan positivis pasca- Renaisance, semua yang tidak bisa diukur tidak bisa ditentukan benar salahnya. Bagi pengikut Marx dan Hegel, kontradiksibukan saja mungkin terjadi, tapi menjadi arah gerakan alam yang sering disebut sebagai dialektika Hegel. Bagi golongan relativis pasca-modern, yang mendasarkan pemiokirannya pada language games ala Wittgenstein ataupun Russel seyiap propisisi adalah bahasa, dan setiap bahasa nilai kebenarannya relatif, karena itu setiap keberanan itu relatif.
Adapun sufastaiyyah, misalnya sama. Menghancurkan kaidah dasar logoka. Yaitu prinsip non-kontradiksi. Hanya Protagoras meniadakannya dalam tingkatan ada-tidaknya segala sesuatu, para positivis meniadakannya pada tingkatan hal yang tidak bisa diindra, Marx dan Hegel meniadaknnya sebagai watak umum segala yang maujud, dan Wittgenstein maupun Russel menghilangkan otoritas fikiran untuk menerapkan kaidahnaya kepada alam di luar fikiran. Hasilnya sama. Runtuhnya seluruh bangunan pengetahuan manusia. Runtuhnya suatu bangunan keyakinan manusia. Bahkan keyakinan tentang adanya dirinya sendiri ! Na’uudzubihi min dzaalik.
Penerapan kaidah-kaidah berfikir yang benar telah menghantarkan para filosof besar pada keyakinan yang pasti akan keberadaan Tuhan. Socraets dengan The Most Beauty -nya. Plato dengan archetype -nya. Aristoteles dengan prime-mover-nya.. ‘Ibn Arabi dengan al-jam’u bainal-‘addaad (coincindentia in oppositorium) nya. Suhrawardi dengan Nur-i-qahir nya. Mulla Shadra dan Mulla Hadi Sabzavary dengan Al-Wujud Al-Muthlaq-nya. Jelas-jelas penerapan logika bagi mereka tidak menentang agama. Malah sebaliknya, me-real-kan agama sampai ke seluruh pori-pori rohaninya yang mingkin. Atau dengan kata lain, mencapai hakikat. Dalam dialog terakhir Socrates, digambarkan betapa figur filsuf ini mati tersenyum setelah menyebut nama Tuhan sebelum akhir hayatnya. Tentang Aristoteles, sebuah riwayat menyatakan bahwa ia adalah seorang nabi yang didustakan ummatnya. Tentang ‘Ibn ‘Arabi, tidak ada yang menyangsingkan sebagai salah seorang sufi terbesar sepanjang sejarah dengan tak terhitung pengalaman ruhani yang tertulis di kurang lebih 700 kitabnya. Sedang Mulla Shadra , tujuh kali haji ke Mekkah dengan berjalan dari Qum (Iran) hanya untuk memenuhi panggilan kekasih-Nya. Alih-alih logika menentang agama, malah logika adalah kendaraan super-executive untuk mencapai hakikat. Dan sekali lagi alih-alih logika menentang agama , tanpa logika agama tak-kan dapat terpahami. Jadi apakah logika menentang agama?
Antara Cinta, Iman dan Akal
Al-‘aqliyyuun yakin bahwa esensi manusia adalah “keberpikirannya”. Bagi mereka semakin sempurna seorang manusia, semakin sempurna pula pemikirannya. Karena itu insan kamil (manusia sempurna) menurut pandangan ini adalah orang yang paling sempurna nalarnya, dalam arti telah menyingkap rahasia wujud (keberadaan) sebagaimana kenyataannya. Tafakkur, -dalam pengertian rasionalnya-, merupakan satu aktifitas utama yang menghantarkan manusia mencapai tujuannya. Sesungguhnya dalam penciptaan langit dan bumi dan pergantian malam dan siang terdapat tanda-tanda bagi ulil – albaab. (Yaitu) orang-ornag yang mengingat Allah sambil berdiri atau duduk atau dalam keadaan berbaring dan mereka memikirkan tentang penciptaan langit dan bumi : ` Yaa Tuhan kami, tiadalah Engkau menciptakan ini dengan sia-sia. Maha Suci Engkau, maka peliharalah kami dari siksa neraka.” (QS Ali ‘Imran 190-191).
Di sisi lain, para ‘urafa, meyakini bahwa esensi manusia adalah al-qalb (hati). Dalam pandangan ini ihsas(rasa) dan ‘isyq (Cinta) manusia mempunyai nilai lebih dibanding tafakkur – nya. Perlu dicatat di sini bahwa ‘isyq bukanlah dalam arti cinta seksual seperti cinta pada umumnya. Ada dua ciri ‘isyq menurut para ‘urafa ;
1. Cinta ini bergerak menuju kepada Allah. Ma’syuq (obyek yang dicintai)-nya hanyalah Allah SWT.2. Cinta ini mengalir pada semua yang maujud; bintang, bulan, matahari dan yang ada di sekalian alam.
Dalam pandangan ini, seluruh keharmonisan alam adalah tanda aliran ‘isyq(Cinta) dalam segala sesuatu.
Bulan dan matahari
Langit dan bumi
Semuanya berputar-putar
Sedang Sang Penyanyi bergeletar
Bulan dan matahari
Langit dan bumi
Semuanya bak berpelukan
Bercumbu dan mencumbu Tuhan semata
Belum lagi ujung rumput nan ber-embun-an
Menambah sejuk segar hawa pagi nan ber-segar-an
Sepoi angin semilir rancak nan bertiupan
Ia pun mengatakan mari kita mencumbu Tuhan
Dalam semua adalah cinta
Meresapi semua adalah cinta
Tapi cinta pada Tuhan semata
Semua mencinta Tuhan semata
Walau mencumbu tapi tak perlu merayu
Walau mencumbu tapi tak perlu memeluk
Cukup katakan pada-Nya Duhai Sang Ayu
Sampai membanjir airmata meninggalkan ceruk
Hati (al-qalb) adalah sentral Cinta. Maka bagaimana agar manusia mencapai insan kamil ? Para ‘urafa yakin bahwa dengan akal (baca; nalar), manusia tidak akan pernah mencapai kesempurnaan yang hakiki. Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi mengatakan;
Kaki para filosof terbuat dari kayu
Kaki yang terbuat dari kayu tidaklah berkekuatan sedikitpun
Sebaliknya para ‘urafa meyakini adanya kitab’azali yang terdapat dalam diri setiap orang. Kitab Agung tempat khazanah pengetahuan Tuhan. Yaitu; hati. Tuhan tidak akan pernah dapat ditampung bimi dan langit, tapi Tuhan dapat ditampung (baca; hadir) pada hati mukmin.Dengan membersihkan hati (tazkiyyatun-nafs) dan mengkonsentrasikan hati serta mengarahkannya hanya kepada Allah, maka seseorang akan dapat mencapai derajat insan kamil.
Dalam kitab sufi tidak terdapat tulisan dan kata,
Yang ada hanya hati putih bak salju
Karena tulisan dan kata hanyalah rerantingan
Sedang Wujud yang dirasa adalah akar
Dan tulisan dan kata hanyalah kekhayalan
Seang rasakanlah Ia yang lebih dekat dari urat leher
Dalam hati sufi tidak terdapat berbagai pengetahuan
Yang ada hanya lah Ia sendiri
Qur’an Suci mengatakan; Beruntunglah mereka yang telah membersihkan dirinya (QS Asy-Syams 9).
Di sisi lain Qur’an Suci mengatakan ; Sesungguhnya manusia itu dalam keadaan merugi. Kecuali orang-orang yang beriman dan beramal shalih, dan saling berwasiat tentang kebenaran, dan saling berwasiat tentang kesabaran. Jelas amal shalih apapun tanpa iman adalah seperti seorang gadis tanpa ruh. Walaupun secantik apapun hanyalah mayat. Sebaliknya iman tanpa amal shalih pun mustahil, seperti adanya aliran elektron tanpa arus listrik.
Iman (+amal shalih), akal dan cinta adalah tiga ekivalensi tapi mempunyai dimensi masing-masing. Tidak mungkin beriman terhadap sesuatu yang tidak masuk akal. Tidak mungkin mencintai sesuatu yang tidak diimani wujud-nya. Dan tidak mungkin akal kita dapat berkonsentrasi terus menerus untuk menyingkap rahasia Wujud Yang Maha Agung tanpa dorongan dari geletar ‘isyq yang ada dalam dada.
Apa kesimpulannya? Ketiganya hanyalah manifestasi dari satu hal yang sama. Tiadanya yang satu memustikan ketiadaan yang lain. Hanya saja dimensi kehidupan tak berhingga . Mana kala kita pandang dari sudut nalar, akal-lah namanya. Manakala kita pandang dari sudut hati, cinta-lah namanya dan manakala kita pandang dari sudut keyakinan, iman-lah namanya.
Dengan ketiganya, – atau mungkin lebih tepat lagi dengan segenap wujud nya-, seorang manusia dapt mendekatkan diri kepada Allah. Ketika seseorang sampai pada pintu keselamatan, tidak ada lagi hijab antara ia dengan allah. Dia dapat melihat Allah dengan mata hatinya. Baginya Tuhan benar-benar dapat disifati sebagai Azh-Zhaahir ( Yang Maha Lahir), atau bahkan An-Nuur (Cahaya (Mutlak)), sehingga tak ada suatu apa pun yang lebih jelas dari-Nya. Imam Husein bin ‘Ali (r.a.), -cucu Rasulullah (SAW) yang akan menjadi satu dari pemimpin para pemuda di surga-, mengatakan; “ Adakah maujud yang lebih jelas dan terang dari-Mu?”
Sunday, September 27, 2009
What is Carlisle Medical Journal?
Carlisle Medical Journal is a very unique, compact, and user friendly medical journal that can be used to assist anyone in organizing and recording their own medical history. The journal is divided into 9 customized sections. Each multi-colored tab contains the title for each section. The contents of the book fits into a three ring customized binder approximately 9" x 6". Simply fill in the blanks to record important information about your family medical tree; doctors and specialist information; medicines used; allergic reactions; appointments; medical test/ results; surgeries and hospital stays; and journaling your thoughts and experiences. Having access to all this information in one centrally located place can be very helpful to take with you each time you visit any doctor. It would also be helpful to a friend or relative during an emergency situation to have all of your medical history contained in one place.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
Martin Heidegger: About Technology's Age
Nietzsche is the intersection of postmodern philosophers and Martin Heidegger, in which meditations on art and technology, they are always quoted and commented it. Heidegger's contribution to the sense of de-realization of the set of key phrases like: "everywhere we are underway amid beings, and yet we no longer know how it stands with being", and "precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, be his essence ". Heidegger's view of modern technology as the fulfillment of Western metaphysics, which is characterized as a contemporary metaphysics. Since the early philosophers, precisely Plato, Western thought to understand being as the presence of being, which in the modern world means being available for use. The presence being tended to disappear into the transparency of their inapplicability as a ready to use. The essence of technology, which he named as "the enframing" entity being reduced to a calculate arrangement. Thus, mountains are not mountains but a pile of rocks, the river Rheine. Rheine river is not a machine but a hydro-electric energy, and humans are not humans but reserves of human power. The experience of the modern world, then, is a withdrawal being in front of the en framing. However, people affected by the withdrawal itself in moments of anxiety or boredom, and therein lies the road to a possible return of being, which may be equal to the repetition of the experience being expressed by Parmenides and Heraclitus.Heidegger saw this as a realization of the will to power, the other Niersche concept, together with the concept of eternal repetition, fatigue represents the tradition of metaphysics. For Heidegger, the will to power is the eternal new as a (becoming), and permanently stop the moment of metaphysical presence. Becoming an occurrence and death in and being among other beings of the resurrection of the being. So, for Heidegger, Nietzsche marks the end of metaphysical thinking but not a space above it, and Heidegger saw it as a last resort in Oblivion metaphysics of being not yet finished. Hope for a space in a non-metaphysical thinking lies in Holderlin, whose opinions supporting the signs being given by the withdrawal itself.
While post-modernist indebted to Heidegger's reflections on being the unreal and the de-realization of being through enframing technology, they are sharply rejected the works of Nietzsche.
Many postmodern philosopher Heidegger found in a nostalgia not being what they have. In fact, forget the feeling more choose to be happy (cheerful Forgetting) the fun and creativity (playful creativity) in the concept of repetition Niezsche eternal (eternal return) as a repetition of a new and different. The authors are associated with large postmodernism have noted that other Western forgotten and marginalized, including Heidegger, figured by Jews. In this way, they can differentiate their projects from ideas of Heidegger and critically considering his involvement with National Socialism and his silence about the Holocaust, even to say it as something that is not personal. Search Heidegger for his actions and his refusal to take responsibility not to be found in postmodern opinions. However, they will find many points of departure from the philosophical significance of Heidegger on Nietzsche and many examples where Nietzsche's ideas are used to critically against Heidegger.
Monday, July 13, 2009
Sartre vs. Camus
As we learn from Camus and Sartre: The Story of a Friendship and the Quarrel that Ended It, a fascinating and intermittently astute book by Ronald Aronson,1 the two men met in Nazi-occupied Paris at the height of World War II. The occasion was the June 1943 opening of Sartre’s play, The Flies, a recasting of the Orestes revenge story with overtones of Resistance heroism.
By this time, both men were public figures. Sartre’s novel, Nausea, an account of slipping out of ordinary life into the gradually liberating awareness of life’s meaninglessness, had come out five years earlier; his monumental existentialist tract, Being and Nothingness, was about to be published. As for the younger, Algerian-born Camus, both his first novel, The Stranger, and his philosophical signature piece, The Myth of Sisyphus, had been brought out within the previous year to general amazement and acclaim.
Even before the two met, they had reviewed each other’s books. Writing in a left-wing Algerian newspaper, Camus had praised Nausea for its dramatic demonstration that “at the bottom of the most elementary act is its fundamental absurdity.” A few months later, reviewing a collection of Sartre’s short fiction, he singled out its portraits of individuals who, apprehending the absurdity of existence, begin to realize they are free to make anything they choose of their lives, even if they are sometimes distressingly unsure just what that should be.
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus would offer his own depiction of the freedom that comes of accepting the godless universe in which one happens to exist for a brief spell. His appeal to the singular adventure of a life well lived, without hope or fear of eternity, registered powerfully with Sartre. In a 6,000-word review of Camus’s The Stranger—about a man who drifts numbly through life until, condemned for murder, he finds happiness in “the benign indifference of the universe”—Sartre sketched an author, Camus, sounding very much like Sartre himself, especially the Sartre of the fiction Camus had himself reviewed.
Soon after their meeting, as Aronson tells it, an obviously thrilled Sartre offered Camus the chance to direct and play the lead in a touring production of his new play, No Exit (the best thing he ever wrote in any genre). Although the production never came off, the bond had been forged, and seemed made to last. The two men “prized living authentically,” Aronson writes, and authenticity could extend to, and survive, candor and even bluntness between them. During one night’s boozing, Sartre announced their order of intellectual rank: “I’m more intelligent than you, huh? More intelligent.” Camus agreed.
But if Sartre’s was by mutual consent the more imposing mind, Camus was the more impressive man, and both of them knew that as well. Simone de Beauvoir, the writer who was Sartre’s lifelong lover, but whose romance with him admitted all manner of extraneous erotic possibilities, told Camus that he could have her if he wanted her. He did not want her. Sartre, one suspects, found Camus’s refusal more disturbing than Beauvoir’s offer, especially as he happened to be toadishly ugly and Camus handsome and charming.
In addition to handsomeness and charm, Camus also had boldness and courage and integrity; these, along with intelligence, were the qualities Sartre most esteemed. Camus had proved his honor and his nerve in the Resistance against the occupying Nazis, when he edited the clandestine newspaper Combat, whose proud socialist banner read “From Resistance to Revolution.” Sartre for his part had served in the defeated French army, spent several months as a prisoner of war, and then returned to full-time literature.
Sartre was extremely productive during the war. But when he later spoke of himself as “a writer who resisted” rather than a member of the Resistance who wrote, he was implicitly comparing himself to the less intelligent but more impressive Camus. What is Literature?, the classic of literary theory that Sartre wrote just after the war, espouses writing that is itself vital with political commitment—that commitment being, naturally, to the radical Left. Aronson makes the case that the writer who, to Sartre’s mind, best fit his specifications was Camus: “This young man was already the person Sartre was trying to become: the engaged but not starry-eyed or ideological writer, at once ‘poet of freedom’ and political activist.”
Sartre’s enshrining of Camus bore a price, however. In Aronson’s judgment, it complicated the friendship, making Camus fear he would be thought of as Sartre’s creature rather than as his own man. The younger man began to feel that “he had to define himself in contrast to Sartre.”
There may be something to this, but Aronson makes too much of it. In fact, the principal source of the growing disagreement between the two was not psychological but philosophical and political. Already in a 1945 interview Camus contended that his understanding of the absurd had nothing to do with Sartrean existentialism. To be more precise, he was becoming disenchanted with the movement’s Marxist underpinnings, and was looking for a more accommodating basis for the idea of complete freedom of choice. As Camus saw it, if a man was really free, then he could make of himself anything at all; his actions ought not be circumscribed by the particular historical situation he found himself in, and especially ought not be dictated by some intellectual’s telling him he had to decide between behaving admirably like a revolutionary socialist or piggishly like a bourgeois.
By 1951, at any rate, the divergence had become an irreparable rupture. That was the year in which Camus published L’homme révolté, known in English as The Rebel but translated more accurately by Aronson as Man in Revolt. This book ranks with The Myth of Sisyphus and The Fall (1956) among Camus’s greatest works, and as one of the landmark titles of the last century. Unfortunately, Aronson finds it ideologically tendentious, and is not much use in helping one appreciate its excellence.
Man in Revolt indicts what Camus sees as the highest form of modern criminality: mass murder on behalf of noble ideas, and specifically on behalf of the idea of a perfected humanity in the manner of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. To Camus’s mind, the revolutionary nihilism exemplified by the Russian Revolution and by Nazism (though he barely touches upon the latter) is the supremely beguiling and supremely terrible theme of modern life. He traces its intellectual origins to the metaphysical ponderings of such figures as de Sade, Baudelaire, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, and Lautréamont, as well as to the revolutionary zealotry of Saint-Just and Marx. To overthrow the divinely appointed natural order, to institute forever the humane and rational arrangements that will allow all to thrive as never before—these became the ends of the revolutionary, and anything at all was permitted in order to achieve them: starvation, slave labor, a bullet in the back of the skull. Camus wanted no part of this viciousness with its eyes wide open.
Sartre, not unexpectedly, loathed Man in Revolt, considered it a personal affront, and spearheaded the effort to discredit it in the pages of Les temps modernes (Modern Times), the hugely influential journal he edited. A Sartre disciple, Francis Jeanson, was enlisted to savage the book; when Camus wrote a hotly contemptuous letter to the editor, Sartre himself responded by turning up the heat in 10,000 vitriolic words, while Jeanson tossed off a 15,000-word justification of his review. Camus wrote an answer that he never sent.
The controversy between the two men, which would only deepen over time, has been newly documented together with four long essays of scholarly commentary in Sartre and Camus: A Historic Confrontation, edited and translated by David A. Sprintzen and Adrian van den Hoven.2 The decisive quarrel boiled down to this: Camus spoke for freedom and nature, two of the central principles of liberal democracy; Sartre spoke for justice and history, the guiding lights of socialist dictatorship.
Theoretically, an intelligent liberalism could accommodate all of these competing claims. Of the two men, Camus was more willing to approach such a compromise than the intransigent Sartre. But each had his hierarchy, and in the throes of disputation each hardened his own position so that any reconciliation became impossible.
Like Aronson, who decries “cold-war partisanship,” Sprintzen and all but one of his colleagues have a simple explanation for the friends’ bitter falling-out. In Sprintzen’s words, “the polarized environment” of the cold war delimited the thinking of supposedly free and reasonable men. What was responsible for causing this polarized environment was, of course, the conflict between Western democracy and Soviet Communism. About this, the commentators in Sartre and Camus strike a putatively agnostic view, apportioning the blame pretty much equally between the two parties, but with a slight preference for the idea that the West, and particularly the United States, was really the more culpable.
Sartre himself was under no compunctions on this score. In the wake of his dispute with Camus, he began to cleave ever more closely to Moscow’s party line. He became precisely the sort of Communist whom Camus hated most: not only a zealot for his maniacal idea of justice, careless with other men’s blood, but a horrific cynic as well.
To gain admittance to a Communist charade known as the World Peace Congress in Vienna in December 1952, Sartre prohibited a scheduled Viennese production of his 1948 play Dirty Hands, which had offended the Communists, and required that all future productions have the approval of the local Communist party. Two weeks before the Peace Congress opened, he refused to comment publicly on the show trial of the Czech Communist leader Rudolf Slansky, convicted along with others of belonging to an international Jewish conspiracy to undermine the cause of world Communism. Early the next year, he again kept his mouth shut about the “Jewish doctors’ plot” that Stalin had contrived to whip up anti-Semitic hysteria.
Even Aronson is appalled by Sartre’s doggish behavior. For their part, the scholars assembled in Sartre and Camus generally agree that the brouhaha over Man in Revolt showed both Camus and Sartre at their worst, and that their unthinking vehemence in the thrall of competing cold-war ideologies robbed them of their customary perspicacity. But they are utterly wrong about Camus, and wrong again in thinking Sartre customarily perspicacious. The deformity caused by his political vocation was by no means peculiar to the cold-war period but had showed itself earlier and affected his entire literary career.
The philosophical audacity that was existentialism had itself been born of the most banal political idea. As presented in Sartre’s 1946 essay, “Existentialism Is a Humanism”—the essay is essentially a précis of Being and Nothingness—the litany runs like this: there is no God; there is no human nature; there is only the human condition, which is to say, historically determined conditions; within these conditions man is free; “man is nothing else but what he makes of himself”; and each man is responsible for himself—as well as for everyone else.
To put the case plainly, Sartre’s existentialism ends in a socialist fantasy because it begins in a socialist fantasy. The nonexistence of God is treated by him as an indisputable given, not as a demonstrable proposition; the idea that man can make what he will of himself is similarly treated as a given and for the same reason—because it is indispensable to his political project. Without these two assumptions, the argument would go nowhere, for if men are created by God, then Sartrean existentialism is a ridiculous exercise in the higher narcissism. The existence of God must be annulled, because it leads to bad politics.
The same flawed reasoning infects almost all of Sartre’s work, including some of his best. Within the realm of good socialist politics, the war to the death is the war against the bourgeoisie and its political and religious beliefs, which Sartre lavishly despised. In Anti-Semite and Jew (1946), which professes to be a sober meditation on the rational and the irrational in politics, Sartre is lucid and penetrating about the anti-Semitism directed particularly at Jewish intelligence; but when he proceeds to declare anti-Semitism “a bourgeois phenomenon,” from which the virtuous proletariat is, at least in theory, happily free, his analysis goes off the rails. Though he does not spell out the conclusions of his argument, its inexorable logic is that the unsavory attitudes of the bourgeoisie can be eradicated with a clear conscience, even if doing so entails eradicating bourgeois persons along the way.
As Sartre’s politics deform his moral philosophy, so do they turn his fiction into tub-thumping. In the trilogy The Roads of Freedom (1945-1949), which is really an unfinished tetralogy, the word “freedom” appears almost as often as “and” or “the.” Once again, the enemy to be slaughtered without mercy is bourgeois minginess, the epitome of anti-existential unfreedom. In the first installment of the trilogy, titled The Age of Reason, Mathieu, a thirty-year-old intellectual, scrambles over the course of 400 pages for the money to procure an abortion for Marcelle, his lover of seven years; marriage and child being unthinkably bourgeois, both Mathieu and his creator speak of the fetus inside Marcelle as a ripening pustule. In the end, Mathieu gets his “freedom for nothing”—that is, freedom to no apparent purpose—and we are meant to understand this exalted aimlessness as the highest existential awareness anyone can reach. Although there are flashes of brilliance throughout the trilogy, the politicking that shapes Sartre’s philosophy kills his every effort to render living beings in art.
Both as a man and as a writer, Camus had a truer feeling for life, including life’s freedom. This vital capacity made him more sensible, in the fullest meaning of the word. But it must also be said that it limited his penetration as a political intellectual. For all his loathing of Communism and his devotion to freedom in the abstract, for example, Camus fastidiously declined to come out for the democratic West, and particularly for the United States, as bulwarks against the former and champions of the latter.
Camus’s personal moderation and decency make Sartre look like the scoundrel he was. But his hope that moderation and decency would triumph against barbarity was insufficiently appreciative of the unfathomable depth of certain political quandaries—like the one in his beloved native Algeria. In his “Appeal for a Civilian Truce in Algeria,” a lecture delivered in Algiers in 1956 just as Arab anti-colonial militants and immovable French colonists were about to dive into a bloodbath, Camus spoke of a tragic collision of two bands of heedless fanatics, as if, by parting the combatants, temperate intermediaries could yet bring a lasting peace.
But temperance and reasonableness could only delay, not forestall, the fanatical violence, which in Algiers as elsewhere in the modern world was soon directed against the temperate and the reasonable. To argue, as Camus did, that “French and Arabs can be made to coexist . . . [and] that such coexistence will do justice to the rights of both sides” was unconscionably naïve. Today, even Arabs and Arabs do not coexist in Algeria.
The first tremors of militant Islam’s crusade against the West, and also against Arab political moderation, were already shaking the ground in the 1950’s. Camus felt them, but could not divine their full significance. He did write, in his “Preface to Algerian Reports” and “Algeria 1958,” about the dangers that the ambition for Islamic empire presented; that ambition, he said, if unchecked, could lead to World War III. But he mistakenly assumed it would be checked.
How so? In his philanthropic enthusiasm, Camus exhorted men and women like himself to “gather together to beg merely, without making any other claims yet, that on a single spot of the globe a handful of innocent victims be spared.” Camus did not understand, or could not bear to think, that saving lives then would do nothing to prevent the loss of many others’ lives later, and that violent fanaticism must be extinguished if it is not to increase and multiply. Today’s free Algeria, which is what the uncompromising Arabs of Camus’s day demanded, is a place where 100,000 civilians have died since 1992 in a civil war notable even in that part of the world for its uninhibited brutality, and where the Arabs of the Islamic Salvation Front awaken sleeping Arab children in order to slash their throats. Reality has proved too cruel for Camus’s political imagination.
In fact, neither Camus nor Sartre had sufficient imagination when it came to politics. Had they philosophized more and politicized less, their opinions—and, in Sartre’s case, his art—could have been what their exaggerated reputations make them out to be: the outstanding intellectuals of their time.
Still, as between the two of them, and despite Sartre’s extraordinary intellect, Camus’s was without doubt the more significant achievement. Even if he felt too much to think dispassionately, he possessed a born novelist’s instinct for capturing the truth alive. As for Sartre, his passionate temperament issued in a disfiguring taste for revolutionary violence, while his ambition to explain the world as nobody had adequately explained it before issued in encyclopedic fatuity. Sartre knew everything, and everything he knew was wrong.
(see at : http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/)
Thursday, July 9, 2009
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804—1872) was a famous German philospher and atheist. The founder of psychoanalysis Freud heavily borrowed from his book Essence of Christianity to create The Future of an Illusion. What are often thought of as "Freudian" terms are in fact Feuerbachian. Such borrowings can be seen in the words and passages of Essence of Christianity: "wish-fulfillment"; "What man misses—whether this be articulate and therefore conscioius, or an unconscious need—that is his God"; "Man projects his nature into the world outside himself before he finds it in himself"; "To live in projected dream-images is the essence of religion. Religion sacrifices reality to the projected dream." [1] Karl Marx also borrowed from Essence of Christianity, most famously the idea that "religion is the opium of the masses."
Education
Feuerbach matriculated in the University of Heidelberg with the intention of pursuing a career in the Church. Through the influence of Prof. Karl Daub he was led to an interest in the then predominant philosophy of Hegel and, in spite of his father's opposition, enrolled in the University of Berlin, in order to study under the master himself. After twenty two years, the Hegelian influence began to slacken. Feuerbach became associated with a group known as the Young Hegelians, alternately known as the Left Hegelians, who synthesized a radical offshoot of Hegelian philosophy, interpreting Hegel’s dialectic march of spirit through history to mean that existing Western culture and institutional forms—and, in particular, Christianity—would be superseded. "Theology," he wrote to a friend, "I can bring myself to study no more. I long to take nature to my heart, that nature before whose depth the faint-hearted theologian shrinks back; and with nature man, man in his entire quality." These words are a key to Feuerbach's development. He completed his education at Erlangen, at the Friedrich-Alexander-University, Erlangen-Nuremberg with the study of natural science.
Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity)
In part I of his book Feuerbach developed what he calls the "true or anthropological essence of religion." Treating of God in his various aspects "as a being of the understanding," "as a moral being or law," "as love" and so on. Feuerbach talks of how man is equally a conscious being, more so than God because man has placed upon God the ability of understanding. Man contemplates many things and in doing so he becomes acquainted with himself. Feuerbach shows that in every aspect God corresponds to some feature or need of human nature. "If man is to find contentment in God," he claims, "he must find himself in God."
Thus God is nothing else than man: he is, so to speak, the outward projection of man's inward nature. This projection is dubbed as a chimaera by Feuerbach, that God and the idea of a higher being is dependent upon the aspect of benevolence. Feuerbach states that, “a God who is not benevolent, not just, not wise, is no God,” and continues to say that qualities are not suddenly denoted as divine because of their godly association. The qualities themselves are divine therefore making God divine, indicating that man is capable of understanding and applying meanings of divinity to religion and not that religion makes a man divine.
The force of this attraction to religion though, giving divinity to a figure like God, is explained by Feuerbach as God is a being that acts throughout man in all forms. God, “is the principle of [man's] salvation, of [man's] good dispositions and actions, consequently [man's] own good principle and nature.” It appeals to man to give qualities to the idol of their religion because without these qualities a figure such as God would become merely an object, its importance would become obsolete, there would no longer be a feeling of an existence for God. Therefore, Feuerbach says, when man removes all qualities from God, “God is no longer anything more to him than a negative being.” Additionally, because man is imaginative, God is given traits and there holds the appeal. God is a part of man through the invention of a God. Equally though, man is repulsed by God because, “God alone is the being who acts of himself.”
In part 2 he discusses the "false or theological essence of religion," i.e. the view which regards God as having a separate existence over against man. Hence arise various mistaken beliefs, such as the belief in revelation which he believes not only injures the moral sense, but also "poisons, nay destroys, the divinest feeling in man, the sense of truth," and the belief in sacraments such as the
Lord's Supper, which is to him a piece of religious materialism of which "the necessary consequences are superstition and immorality."
Part 2 comes toa crux though by seemingly retracting previous statements. Feuerbach claims that Gods only action is, “the moral and eternal salvation of man: thus man has in fact no other aim than himself,” because man's actions are placed upon God. Feuerbach also contradicts himself by claiming that man gives up his personality and places it upon God who in turn is a selfish being. This selfishness turns onto man and projects man to be wicked and corrupt, that they are, “incapable of good,” and it is only God that is good, “the Good Being.” In this way Feuerbach detracts from many of his earlier assertions while showing the alienation that takes place in man by worshipping God. Feuerbach affirms that goodness is, “personified as God,” turning God into an object because if God was anything but an object nothing would need to be personified on him. The aspect of objects having previously been discussed; in that man contemplates objects and that objects themselves give conception of what externalizes man. Therefore if God is good so then should be man because God is merely an externalization of man because God is an object. However religion would show that man is inherently corrupt. Feuerbach tries to lessen his inconsistency by asking if it was possible if, “I could perceive the beauty of a fine picture if my mind were aesthetically an absolute piece of perversion?” Through Feuerbach’s reasoning it would not be possible but it is possible and he later states that man is capable of finding beauty.
The “New” Philosophy
there are certain fundamental themes that occur again and again in the later Feuerbach, even though, as we shall see, commentators have differed among themselves concerning the interpretation of these themes, differences occasioned in part by Feuerbach's own ambiguities and sometimes by his changing views. Chief among these themes are: (1) that the human organism is related to the world through its body and the senses (Sensuousness); (2) that the species-being (essence) of man is contained only in community which, however, “rests on the reality of the distinction between I and thou” (GW IX: 339; PPF 91); (3) that mind and body are just two aspects of one material organism; (4) that this organism is animated by an overwhelming drive for fulfillment (Glückseligkeitstrieb) which, in turn, manifests itself in needs and desires. Of these needs, the need for human community is fundamental as are also certain biological needs. Given these themes, the two dominant philosophical problems that emerge are (a) how to delineate the relationship between perception and thought in order to give an intelligible account of knowing and (b) how, after basing human nature on a drive to fulfillment, he can reconcile this with his ethics of altruism.
Many of the themes are, of course, formulated in antithesis to idealism and, hence, an affirmation of some mode of materialism. The argument is that modern philosophy in its search for something immediately certain founded itself on self-consciousness, that is, the thinking ego. But this self-consciousness was only a being conceived and mediated through abstraction. The new philosophy claims that “certainty and immediately are only given by the senses, perception, and feeling” (GW IX: 320; PPF 55). Only the sensuous is clear and certain. Hence, “the secret of immediate knowledge is sensuousness” (GW IX: 321; PPF 55).
Whereas the old philosophy started by saying, “I am an abstract and merely a thinking being to whose essence the body does not belong,” the new philosophy, on the other hand, begins by saying, “I am a real, sensuous being and indeed, the body in its totality is my ego, my essence (Wesen) itself.” (GW IX: 320; PPF 54)
What Feuerbach ultimately proposes is a thorough examination of human nature, its needs, successes and desires. It is only then, he argues, that we will have a complete “philosophy of the future’”
He expressed in an eager, disjointed, but condensed and laboured fashion, certain deep-lying convictions -- that philosophy must come back from unsubstantial metaphysics to the solid facts of human nature and natural science, that the human body was no less important than the human spirit ("Der Mensch ist was er isst", "Man is what he eats") and that Christianity was utterly out of harmony with the age. His convictions gained weight from the simplicity, uprightness and diligence of his character; but they need a more effective justifcation than he was able to give them.
econdo Feuerbach invece, è nel finito che deve essere ritrovato l'infinito , non viceversa; l'infinito stesso è pensabile soltanto attraverso il finito e la negazione del finito. L'inizio della filosofia non è dunque Dio o l'Assoluto, ma ciò che è finito, determinato e reale. La filosofia dell'avvenire, in quanto antropologia, riconoscendo il finito come infinito, deve partire, non da come aveva fatto Hegel, dal pensiero autosufficiente, inteso come soggetto capace di costruirsi con le sue proprie forze, bensì dal vero soggetto, di il cui pensiero è soltanto un predicato. Esso è l'uomo in carne e ossa, mortale dotato di sensibilità e bisogni: in questo consiste l'umanesimo di Feuerbach. Occorre dunque partire da ciò che dà valore al pensiero stesso, ossia dall'intuizione sensibile perché veramente reale è soltanto ciò che è sensibile . Solo attraverso i sensi un oggetto è dato come immediatamente certo: il sensibile infatti non ha bisogno di dimostrazione, perché costringe subito a riconoscere la sua esistenza. In questa prospettiva, la natura non si trova più ridotta a semplice forma estraniata dello spirito, come avveniva in Hegel, ma diventa la base reale della vita dell'uomo. Si apre così la possibilità di una nuova filosofia, il sensualismo , che è la risoluzione compiuta della teologia in antropologia: in essa è superata ogni scissione tra uomo e mondo, corpo e spirito.
La filosofia dell’avvenire. La filosofia di Feuerbach vuole essere un completo rovesciamento della filosofia religiosa e dell’idealismo hegeliano. L’inizio della filosofia non deve più essere Dio o l’Assoluto bensì l’uomo, e l’uomo determinato, concreto. L’uomo è un essere naturale, reale, sensibile, e come tale deve essere considerato dalla filosofia che non può ridurlo ad un concetto o a puro pensiero o a sola razionalità ma deve considerarlo integralmente, "dalla testa al calcagno". La nuova filosofia, la filosofia del futuro sarà la "risoluzione completa della teologia (hegeliana) nella antropologia". La nuova filosofia di Feuerbach vuole essere un umanesimo: è l’uomo l’unico vero oggetto della filosofia, e l’uomo nella sua concretezza, nella sua corporeità, nella sua fisicità (Feuerbach giunge a dire, in modo un po’ paradossale ma che indica bene la sua esigenza di concretezza, che "l’uomo è ciò che mangia": si noti che in tedesco è un gioco di parole che suona così : Mann ist wa isst). "La vera dialettica – sostiene Feuerbach – è un dialogo tra l’io e il tu". Non ha nulla a che vedere con assoluto, essenze e simili. Se poi l’uomo è un essere sociale, allora l’amore è la passione dominante dell’uomo stesso. Dunque l’amore per l’uomo, la filantropia, dev’essere lo scopo principale della filosofia
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